Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights by Cox, Prentiss
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2016
Public Enforcement Compensation and Private
Rights
Prentiss Cox
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cox, Prentiss, "Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights" (2016). Minnesota Law Review. 227.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/227
  
 
2313 
Article 
Public Enforcement Compensation and 
Private Rights 
Prentiss Cox† 
  INTRODUCTION   
On July 18, 2012, the newly created United States Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) settled its first en-
forcement action.1 The CFPB alleged that Capital One Bank 
targeted subprime credit card holders with solicitations for 
credit monitoring services, falsely stated these services were 
free, and misrepresented the benefits.2 The settlement required 
the bank to provide account credits to card holders for the full 
cost of the services plus amounts incurred for interest and bank 
fees, resulting in estimated total consumer refunds of $140 mil-
lion.3 The settlement also required the bank to comply with a 
plan to reform its marketing practices and pay a $25 million 
penalty.4 The agency followed its action against Capital One 
with a series of similar cases involving “add-on” charges by 
credit card issuers,5 which are part of over $11.2 billion in re-
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, Co-Director of Law in Practice, University 
of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks the following individuals for ad-
vice and helpful criticism: Mark Totten, Jim Tierney, Steve Houck, Kevin 
O’Connor, Lesley Fair, Katie Porter, Patrick Madigan, Jill Hasday, Allan 
Erbsen, Dan Schwarcz, Kaitlin Caruso, Jonathon Reischl, Amy Widman, Eric 
Halperin, Adam Zimmerman, Adam Levitin, Dee Pridgen, Urska Velikonja, 
and Stephanie Enerson. Copyright © 2016 by Prentiss Cox. 
 1. Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Probe into Capital One Credit Card Mar-
keting Results in $140 Million Consumer Refund (July 18, 2012), http://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-capital-one-probe. 
 2. Stipulation and Consent Order, In re Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., 
CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0001, at 3–8 (July 18, 2012) [hereinafter Capital One 
Consent Order]. 
 3. Id. at 13–20; Press Release, CFPB, supra note 1. 
 4. Capital One Consent Order, supra note 2, at 8–13, 21–23 (discussing 
compliance requirements), 20–21 (discussing civil penalty). 
 5. Press Release, CFPB, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard 
Cordray on the Bank of America Enforcement Action Press Call (Apr. 9, 2014), 
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funds or other relief to 25.5 million consumers through CFPB 
enforcement actions during its first years of existence.6 
A nascent scholarly view is emerging that recipients of 
public enforcement compensation should be given the proce-
dural protections afforded to class members in class action cas-
es.7 For the CFPB action against Capital One, this would have 
meant submitting the settlement agreement to judicial review, 
sending notices to credit card holders whose accounts were 
charged by the bank, and providing these consumers with an 
opportunity to accept or opt out of the refund, rather than the 
CFPB simply arranging for automatic account credits. Over the 
last fifteen years, state attorneys general have brought several 
similar enforcement actions alleging deception in charges add-
ed to credit card or other consumer accounts.8 As part of this 
new scholarship critiquing public compensation, a 2012 article 
in the Harvard Law Review by Margaret Lemos suggests that 
consumer payments like those that occurred in these state en-
forcement cases raise constitutional Due Process concerns.9 
The new scholarship on public enforcement compensation 
is wrong in analysis and prescription. This Article presents an 
alternative framework for understanding the relationship be-
tween public compensation and the private rights of recipients 
 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director 
-richard-cordray-on-the-bank-of-america-enforcement-action-press-call (an-
nouncing settlement with $727 million in consumer refunds and noting the 
case was CFPB’s fifth enforcement action related to credit card add-on prod-
ucts). 
 6. CFPB, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: BY THE NUMBERS 
(Oct. 2015), http://cdn.thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/101651 
06/2015-10-26-CFPB-By-the-Numbers.pdf. 
 7. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representa-
tive Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 491–92 (2012); 
Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1999–2002 (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distrib-
uting Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 504–07 (2011); see also Seth Davis, Im-
plied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 45 (2014) (discussing 
“substitute suits” that provide monetary relief). This Article uses the term 
“public enforcement compensation,” or “public compensation” for ease of refer-
ence, to mean an order or agreement resulting from a public civil enforcement 
action that creates an obligation by the defendant to compensate a numerous 
group of people. 
 8. See Prentiss Cox, The Invisible Hand of Preacquired Account Market-
ing, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 439–40 (2010) (describing enforcement actions 
by state attorneys general); see also State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc., 834 
N.W.2d 12, 33 (Iowa 2013) (awarding approximately $36 million in restitution 
to Iowa consumers for charges to their credit cards and bank accounts). 
 9. Lemos, supra note 7, at 531–42. 
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of that compensation. Public compensation is defined by two 
realities: first, government enforcers obtain public compensa-
tion under different forms of statutory authority in various 
regulatory fields; second, it is a discretionary remedy in public 
civil law enforcement. Because public compensation occurs un-
der various statutory authorities in a multitude of enforcement 
areas, the relationship between public compensation and pri-
vate rights has to be understood contextually. Calls for sweep-
ing procedural reforms make little sense without attention to 
these differing legal and enforcement environments. Because 
public compensation is a discretionary remedial option, it pre-
sents no substantially different issues regarding conflicts be-
tween public enforcement and private rights than the myriad 
other choices made by public officials in selecting and prosecut-
ing targets within their authority. 
The billions of dollars in public compensation already dis-
tributed to consumers in the short life of the CFPB parallels 
billions in public compensation obtained by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), state attorneys general, and other government entities 
active in civil law enforcement. Payment to consumers, inves-
tors, and employees has been part of government civil law en-
forcement for decades, but the frequency and dollar amounts of 
these cases have risen sharply.10 As class actions recede under 
judicial and legislative pressure,11 the burgeoning scholarship 
on public compensation lays the groundwork for limits on this 
remedy. 
This Article offers four contributions to the emerging 
scholarship on public compensation. First, it maps the existing 
law and practice in public compensation cases, which has oc-
curred only in bits and pieces in prior work. Knowledge of the 
legal authority granted byand constraints imposed 
byvarying statutory schemes is a critical and usually over-
looked starting point for understanding public compensation.  
Second, the Article identifies an error in the prior scholar-
ship on the central issue of the preclusive effect of public com-
pensation on subsequent private claims for monetary relief. 
Lemos is wrong in asserting that the “prevailing view” of courts 
 
 10. See infra note 200. 
 11. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation 
in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 658–60 
(2012) (concluding that “[c]lass actions are on the ropes,” resulting in an “en-
forcement gap”). 
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is that public compensation results in preclusion of later pri-
vate claims for monetary relief.12 Accordingly, concerns about 
constitutional deprivations arising from public compensation 
are misplaced. Her erroneous assertion about preclusion rests 
on a failure to differentiate the various statutory schemes un-
der which government enforcers obtain public compensation. It 
also reflects a mistaken premise that public compensation is a 
government form of class action litigation.  
The notion that public compensation and class actions are 
functional equivalents is employed in the new scholarship to 
argue that the imposition of class action procedures in public 
compensation would better protect the interests of the relief re-
cipients. The third contribution of this Article is to explore and 
reject the usefulness of this analogy for understanding and 
structuring public compensation. This analogy has roots in 
largely unsuccessful arguments by enforcement defendants in a 
variety of contexts.13 Indeed, corporate defendants have cited 
the new scholarship in recent challenges to government en-
forcement actions seeking public compensation.14 The decision 
by a government enforcer to pursue public compensation does 
not diminish the public nature of the enforcement action and 
does not convert public officials into representatives of private 
interests. Public and private enforcement can overlap in pur-
pose and consequence, but a focus on similarities distracts from 
the fundamentally distinct nature of public versus private en-
forcement.  
Fourth, the Article identifies two categories of public com-
pensation cases which can result in a practical, meaningful loss 
of private rights. The Article presents proposals for law reform 
to better align public purpose and private rights in these two 
types of cases.  
The Article proceeds roughly in alignment with these four 
contributions. Part I is an overview of the government enforce-
ment entities that obtain public compensation in four discrete 
areas of market regulation and the varying statutory schemes 
that provide authority for this remedy. Part II summarizes the 
scholarship arguing that public compensation should operate 
under stricter procedural constraints because it achieves the 
same result as a class action and purportedly raises similar 
problems of accountability and consent, yet lacks the rigorous 
 
 12. For Lemos’s assertion, see Lemos, supra note 7, at 500. 
 13. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 14. See infra note 225. 
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procedural protections governing class actions. Part III demon-
strates that public compensation is not preclusive of later pri-
vate claims and examines how the mistaken premises in the ex-
isting scholarship appear to have influenced the error in the 
Lemos article. Part IV broadens the discussion to look at the 
distortions in understanding public compensation caused by 
scholarly reliance on the analogy between public compensation 
and class action cases. Part V narrows the discussion to focus 
on practical conflicts that occur between public compensation 
and private rights, and means of avoiding these conflicts.15 
I.  THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC COMPENSATION   
This Part explicates the types of government enforcement 
actions that result in public compensation and the legal author-
ity for this remedy.  
A. REGULATORY AREAS OF PUBLIC COMPENSATION 
Government enforcers regularly obtaining public compen-
sation can be categorized by the markets or conduct over which 
the entity has regulatory authority. Public compensation tends 
to follow distinct patterns in the following four areas: consumer 
protection, antitrust, securities, and employment.16 A brief sur-
vey of each of these areas follows. 
1. Consumer Protection  
The longest-standing routine use of public compensation is 
found in consumer protection cases brought by the FTC and 
state attorneys general.17 These entities bring actions in a 
 
 15. “Private rights” in this Article refers to the rights of recipients, includ-
ing potential recipients, of public compensation, and not the rights of enforce-
ment defendants, which would open an entirely different set of issues. 
 16. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has enforcement au-
thority in each of the four regulatory areas. It has authority to pursue public 
compensation in civil law enforcement for employees under various employ-
ment discrimination laws, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2012); Michael Waterstone, 
A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 461–78 (2007), for 
tenants and homeowners subject to discrimination under the Fair Housing 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(B) (2012), and for consumer financial protection of 
active duty military members under the Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act, 50 
U.S.C. app. § 597 (2012). The DOJ also plays a critical role in antitrust en-
forcement, although it lacks authority to pursue public compensation in such 
cases. Patricia A. Conners, Current Trends and Issues in State Antitrust En-
forcement, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 37, 55 (2003).  
 17. See Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections on Anti-
trust Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 432 (1997) (noting that the FTC has 
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broad array of industries employing their authority to pursue 
violations of unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) 
laws.18 In 2013, the FTC obtained $297 million in public com-
pensation in its UDAP cases.19 The FTC and state attorneys 
general have used their UDAP authority to challenge fraudu-
lent practices in entire market segments, but they also bring a 
variety of modest-sized cases against individual companies.20 
While the FTC and state attorneys general have broad 
marketplace purview, a segment of federal and state regulators 
seek public compensation for deceptive practices and other law 
violations involving consumer financial products. Federal bank-
ing regulators that regularly obtain public compensation are 
the CFPB, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).21 Banking 
regulators order public compensation incident to their supervi-
sion examinations or seek it in enforcement actions resulting 
from investigations of suspected problems. In 2012, for exam-
ple, the FDIC alleged an affiliate of Bancorp Bank was illegally 
“charging student account holders multiple nonsufficient fund 
 
made “widespread use” of public compensation since the 1980s); John W. 
Wade & Robert D. Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded Consumers: Making 
the Remedy Effective Through Suit by Governmental Agency, 37 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1031, 1057–65 (1969) (describing the early use of public compensation by 
the FTC and state attorneys general). 
 18. JONATHON SHELDON ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FEDERAL 
DECEPTION LAW § 1.5 (2d ed. 2016); see Lesley Fair, Federal Trade Commis-
sion Advertising Enforcement, FTC 6–10 (Mar. 1, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/attachments/training-materials/enforcement.pdf (collecting 
cases in which the FTC has obtained monetary remedies for consumers). 
 19. FTC, STATS AND DATA 2013 (Jan.–Dec. 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/attachments/stats-data-2013/statsdata2013.pdf. 
 20. State attorneys general, for example, used UDAP law to lead public 
enforcement efforts against subprime mortgage lenders both before and after 
the mortgage market collapse that led to the financial crisis. See Mark Totten, 
The Enforcers & the Great Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611 (2015). An ex-
ample of a routine UDAP enforcement resulting in public compensation is a 
joint case brought by the FTC and the Florida Attorney General in which own-
ers of timeshare interests in real estate received $16.9 million in restitution of 
fees paid to a company falsely claiming to have buyers ready to purchase their 
timeshare interests. Judgment and Final Order, FTC v. Info. Mgmt. Forum, 
Inc., No. 6:12-cv-00986-JA-KRS, at 8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2013).  
 21. The OCC and FDIC are “prudential” banking regulators charged pri-
marily with ensuring the safety and soundness of their regulated financial in-
stitutions. Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regu-
lation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2018, 
2043 (2014); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Agency Coordination in Consumer 
Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 329, 331 (describing overlapping UDAP au-
thority of FTC, state regulators and federal banking regulators). 
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(NSF) fees from a single merchant transaction” and other con-
duct related to NSF fees, including taking funds typically used 
to cover tuition expenses to pay the improper NSF charges.22 
The FDIC obtained a Consent Order with extensive require-
ments for operational changes, a civil penalty of $172,000 for 
Bankcorp Bank and $110,000 for its affiliate, and restitution 
estimated at $11 million, which was provided by the bank di-
rectly to account holders as credits for the full amount of the 
overcharges.23 State financial regulators also obtain public 
compensation for consumers in the banking, insurance, and re-
al estate sectors.24  
2. Antitrust  
The FTC obtains public compensation in civil antitrust 
cases, although it historically has been more cautious in seek-
ing public compensation in antitrust cases than in UDAP cas-
es.25 State attorneys general play a substantial role in public 
compensation in antitrust, with authority under both federal 
and state law to seek relief for consumers.26 States commonly 
bring antitrust enforcement actions cooperatively in a single 
 
 22. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Announces Settlements with Higher One, 
Inc., New Haven, Connecticut, and the Bancorp Bank, Wilmington, Delaware 
for Unfair and Deceptive Practices (Aug. 8, 2012), https://www.fdic.gov/news/ 
news/press/2012/pr12092.html. 
 23. Id. 
 24. States have parallel authority to federal regulators in banking and 
primary authority over insurance and real estate transactions. See, e.g., Re-
view of the National Bank Preemption Rules: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 132–40 (2004) (statement of 
Gavin M. Gee, Director of Finance, State of Idaho, on behalf of the Conference 
of State Bank Supervisors) (describing the dual banking system and listing 
examples of restitution in enforcement actions by numerous state banking 
commissioners); Theodore Allegaert, Comment, Derivative Actions by Policy-
holders on Behalf of Mutual Insurance Companies, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1063, 
1069–70 (1996) (noting that “[s]tates regulate insurance more than almost any 
other industry, due in part to a near total absence of federal insurance regula-
tion” and “[f]ines and restitution” are common remedies obtained by state in-
surance commissioners). 
 25. D. Bruce Hoffman, To Certify or Not: A Modest Proposal for Evaluat-
ing the “Superiority” of a Class Action in the Presence of Government Enforce-
ment, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1383, 1387 (2005). In 2003, the FTC issued a 
policy statement limiting the circumstances under which it would seek public 
compensation, but the FTC withdrew the policy in 2012 because it created “an 
overly restrictive view of the Commission’s options for equitable remedies.” 
Withdrawal of the Commission Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Rem-
edies in Competition Cases, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,070 (Aug. 7, 2012). 
 26. See infra Part I.B.4. 
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action known as a “multistate” case.27 State antitrust enforce-
ment raises unique issues in public compensation.28 
In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation,29 a suit 
jointly filed by the FTC and ten state attorneys general against 
a drug manufacturer, provides an apt example of public com-
pensation in the antitrust context. The FTC and the states al-
leged that four manufacturers conspired to monopolize the 
market for generic anti-anxiety medications, allegedly raising 
the price nineteen-fold.30 The settlement of the suit resulted in 
over $71 million in public compensation, with more than 
244,000 claims filed by consumers who were expected to obtain 
full compensation for overpayment on the price of these medi-
cations.31 
3. Securities 
Investors receive public compensation from the enforce-
ment actions of the SEC. The SEC obtains disgorgement of ille-
gal gains and can, in its discretion, seek distribution of these 
funds to investors.32 The SEC also can use civil penalties to 
provide investor restitution through the “Fair Funds” program 
created by Congress in the wake of corporate accounting scan-
dals.33 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
and state securities regulators also distribute public compensa-
tion to investors.34  
 
 27. Conners, supra note 16, at 37 (describing the development and organi-
zation of multistate antitrust cases); Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The 
Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1004, 1021 
(2001) (describing multistate antitrust attorney general enforcement actions). 
 28. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 29. 205 F.R.D. 369 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 30. Id. at 373; Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in 
Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 226–27 (2003) (describing the suits 
against the drug manufacturer, including allegation of price rise from anti-
trust conduct, and settlement arrangements). 
 31. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. at 376, 377 
n.14. 
 32. Verity Winship, Public Agencies and Investor Compensation: Exam-
ples from the SEC and CFTC, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 137, 145–46 (2009).  
 33. Id. at 138; see Fair Funds for Investors, 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012). 
 34. The Role of State Securities Regulators in Protecting Investors: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 10–
11 (2004) (statement of Joseph P. Borg, Director, Alabama Securities Commis-
sion; Chairman, Enforcement Section of the North American Securities Ad-
ministrators Association, Inc.) (citing survey of state securities regulators find-
ing over $660 million in “restitution, rescission and disgorgement” in 2002 and 
2003). The CFTC usually arranges for investor compensation in a role akin to 
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An exhaustive 2014 study of SEC public compensation cas-
es from 2002 to 2013 found that SEC ordered more than $14 
billion in public compensation.35 The study also found that pub-
lic compensation focused on different types of securities law 
violations than private securities class action cases.36 Partly 
due to statutory reforms that limit private securities class ac-
tions, public compensation constitutes the only form of mone-
tary relief for investors in more than half of cases in which the 
SEC obtains such relief.37 
4. Employment 
Employees receive public compensation from the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC).38 EEOC pub-
lic compensation is obtained through “pattern and practice” 
cases that challenge systemic employment discrimination prac-
tices.39 The EEOC can also seek relief for individual employees 
in addition to the aggregate relief of concern here.40 An example 
of an EEOC public compensation case is a 2009 settlement fol-
lowing litigation against Outback Steakhouse for employment 
conditions that limited the promotion of women to senior man-
agement positions.41 The settlement resulted in a $19 million 
fund that identified two categories of women who had the op-
portunity to file a claim and obtain relief as determined by a 
 
arbitrator rather than through public compensation, Winship, supra note 32, 
at 147–52, but it also obtains public compensation in certain enforcement ac-
tions. See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter Wise 
Commodities, LLC, No. 12-81311-cv, 2014 WL 4050008, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. May 
16, 2014) (awarding over $52 million in restitution to be distributed at the dis-
cretion of the court-appointed monitor); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. Milton, No. 10-80738-cv, 2013 WL 2158428, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2013) 
(awarding “restitution to all defrauded customers”). 
 35. Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence 
from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 332–33 (2015). 
 36. See id. at 391 (“[SEC] distributions . . . dwarf class action recoveries 
except in accounting fraud cases.”). 
 37. Id. at 369–71. 
 38. Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice After Wal-Mart: 
The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 120–24 (2013). 
 39. See id. at 93. 
 40. See id. at 121. See generally Pauline T. Kim, Addressing Systemic Dis-
crimination: Public Enforcement and the Role of the EEOC, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
1133, 1136–38 (2015) (explaining the difference between cases on behalf of an 
aggrieved individual and EEOC systemic discrimination cases). 
 41. Consent Decree, EEOC v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., No. 06-cv-
01935-CMA-KLM, 2009 WL 5177751 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2009). 
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neutral or the EEOC.42 The settlement also included agree-
ments by Outback to reform its employment promotion proce-
dures.43 
B. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR PUBLIC COMPENSATION 
Public compensation almost always is based on statutory 
authority. This statutory authority, in turn, sometimes reflects 
specific circumstances and history of the regulatory area in 
which the government enforcer acts. Understanding public 
compensation requires attention to these varying statutory 
schemes and enforcement environments. Government enforcers 
rely on one of three types of legal authority to obtain public 
compensation: (1) statutory injunctive authority; (2) express 
statutory authority; or (3) parens patriae authority. The follow-
ing three subparts explain each type of legal authority, all of 
which grant broad powers to, and occasionally impose re-
straints on, government enforcers seeking public compensation. 
The fourth subpart looks at the unique character of public com-
pensation in state antitrust enforcement.  
1. Statutory Injunctive Authority 
The foundational case for public compensation is Porter v. 
Warner Holding Co., decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1946.44 The defendant in Porter was a landlord found to have 
charged hundreds of tenants rent in excess of wartime price 
controls.45 The Office of Price Administration (OPA) brought an 
enforcement action to stop the overcharges and require restitu-
tion payments to the tenants.46 Lacking specific authority for 
such relief, the Administrator relied on a statute authorizing 
the court to grant an injunction “or other order” upon proof of a 
violation of the law.47 The district court order, affirmed by the 
Eighth Circuit, granted the Administrator an injunction 
against further excessive rent but determined that the Admin-
istrator lacked authority to obtain restitution for the tenants 
under this statute.48  
 
 42. Id. at *34–47. 
 43. Id. at *12–34. 
 44. 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
 45. Id. at 396–97. 
 46. Id. at 396. 
 47. Id. at 397. 
 48. Id. 
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The Supreme Court reversed and held that “an order for 
recovery and restitution of illegal rents” was a proper equitable 
remedy within the meaning of the price control statute and also 
within the equitable power of the court to shape remedies as 
necessary to enforce compliance with the statute.49 The Court 
distinguished the equitable remedy of restitution from the legal 
right of tenants to sue for damages under the same statute.50 
The Administrator’s request for restitution in equity invoked 
“broader and more flexible” powers of the court because it was 
in the public interest, and thus “within the highest tradition of 
a court of equity.”51 
Statutory authorization for injunctive relief, as used by the 
Administrator in Porter, has been called a “statutory injunc-
tion.”52 The rationale of Porter linking public compensation to 
the broad equitable powers of the court remains vital in public 
compensation almost seven decades later. Many government 
enforcers continue to use statutory injunctive authority for pub-
lic compensation, and the FTC and the CFTC primarily rely on 
this authority.53 It is often used by federal agencies who sporad-
ically seek public compensation. HUD, for example, used this 
authority to obtain an award of over $8 million for hundreds of 
land purchasers for violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full 
Disclosure Act.54 State attorneys general commonly rely on 
statutory injunctive authority for public compensation when 
state law does not provide express authority.55 
 
 49. Id. at 398–99. 
 50. Id. at 401–02. 
 51. Id. at 398, 401–02.  
 52. See Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Envi-
ronmental Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513 (1984); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, 
Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524 (1982). 
 53. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. 
Corp., 531 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding CFTC statute similar to 
the statute interpreted in Porter and collecting cases allowing CFTC to use 
statutory injunctive authority for restitution or disgorgement); Peter C. Ward, 
Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good In-
tentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1184–95 (1992). 
 54. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales 
Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 924 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 55. See CAROLYN CARTER & JONATHON SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE 
ACTS AND PRACTICES § 13.5.4.1 (8th ed. 2012) (stating that the “overwhelming 
majority of courts find it within their equitable power to grant restitution as 
relief even when this is not provided for in the UDAP statute”); see also State 
ex rel. McGraw v. Imperial Mktg., 506 S.E.2d 799, 811–12 (W. Va. 1998). 
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2. Express Statutory Authority 
Most government enforcers active in seeking public com-
pensation at both the federal and state level rely on express 
statutory authority, in part or in whole.56 State attorneys gen-
eral typically use express statutory authority for UDAP en-
forcement,57 and state financial regulators also distribute public 
compensation under statutory schemes.58 Some states also ex-
pressly authorize local government enforcement entities to ob-
tain public compensation.59 
The statutes expressly authorizing public compensation of-
ten contain only a word or phrase providing for the entity to ob-
tain or the court to order “restitution,” “recovery” or “restora-
tion” of money or property, or disgorgement. The authorization 
to obtain the identified remedies can appear in isolation or can 
be lumped into a list of options, including reference to general 
judicial equitable authority as the context for the granted pow-
er. For example, the Illinois Attorney General has authoriza-
tion to obtain “restitution” for UDAP violations,60 while New 
Jersey authorizes a court order “of rescission, restitution or 
disgorgement or any other order within the court’s power” for 
violations of state securities law.61 The newest entrant to public 
compensation, the recently created CFPB, obtains public com-
pensation under authority in the Dodd-Frank Act that lists a 
gamut of concepts, including most terms that can be found in 
statutes expressly authorizing public compensation: “(A) rescis-
sion or reformation of contracts; (B) refund of moneys or return 
of real property; (C) restitution; (D) disgorgement or compensa-
 
 56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012) (EEOC); 12 U.S.C. § 5565 (2012) 
(CFPB); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6) (2012) (FDIC and OCC). The SEC and the FTC 
combine statutory injunctive and express statutory authority, as described in 
this subpart. 
 57. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 55, § 13.5.4.1, app. A (collecting stat-
utes); DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE 
LAW § 7:13, apps. 3A, 7A (2012) (collecting statutes); Albert Norman Shelden 
& Stephen Gardner, A Truncated Overview of State Consumer Protection 
Laws, C485 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 375, 386–87 (1994). 
 58. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-817 (2015) (Connecticut insurance 
commissioner authority); MO. REV. STAT. § 409.6-603 (2015) (Missouri securi-
ties commissioner authority); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383:10-d (2016) (New 
Hampshire insurance commissioner authority). 
 59. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2016) (authorizing 
suits for unfair practices by district attorneys and certain city attorneys). 
 60. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/7 (2016). 
 61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-69 (West 2015). 
  
2016] PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT COMPENSATION 2325 
 
tion for unjust enrichment; (E) payment of damages or other 
monetary relief.”62  
Public compensation under statutory injunctive authority 
and most of the terms used in statutes expressly authorizing 
public compensation are forms of equitable relief and typically 
reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.63 Consistent with 
the public compensation rationale in Porter, the broad dictates 
of equity are found to allow more flexible methods of proof to 
obtain an award of public compensation compared to private 
class actions.64 A few government enforcers, however, are au-
thorized to obtain damages.65  
Statutory injunctive authority and express statutory au-
thority often overlap. The FTC has both types of authority, and 
uses them alternatively depending on the type of case and en-
forcement objectives.66 The public compensation power of the 
SEC provides an example of express statutory authority evolv-
ing out of prior reliance on statutory injunctive authority. The 
 
 62. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(g)(2) (2012). 
 63. See, e.g., SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 2014); FTC v. 
Wash. Data Res., Inc., 704 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 64. See SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 31 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 1564 (2014) (“[T]he court need not determine the amount of such [un-
just] gains with exactitude.”); FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 69 (2d Cir. 
2006) (restitution is based on “reasonably approximated” unjust gains of de-
fendants); Christopher J. Willis & Stefanie H. Jackman, What Is an Attorney 
General’s Burden of Proof? (Mar. 8, 2010) (UDAP Litigation Against Financial 
Institutions conference paper), http://media.straffordpub.com/products/udap 
-litigation-against-financial-institutions-merging-theories-and-the-foreclosure 
-documentation-crisis-2010-11-30/reference-material.pdf (categorizing states 
by strictness of proof required for UDAP public compensation and observing 
that “the vast majority” of states allow for relaxed proof standards for restitu-
tion); infra note 78 and accompanying text (flexible proof allowed in state anti-
trust actions under Clayton Act). But see Donald R. Livingston, EEOC Pattern 
or Practice Litigation (Mar. 23–27, 2010) (ABA National Conference on EEO 
Law conference paper) (collecting cases showing a split among courts as to 
precision of proof in EEOC pattern and practice cases). 
 65. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2) (2012) (authorizing damages in CFPB 
enforcement actions). The DOJ obtains injunctive relief and “such other relief 
as the court deems appropriate, including monetary damages to persons ag-
grieved” in enforcing the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(B) (2012), 
and Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 597 (2012).  
 66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b), 57b(b) (2012); PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra 
note 57, § 7:13 (explaining that an agency may base an action on either the 
express or the implied authority of the applicable statute); Ward, supra note 
53 (tracing the history of two sources of authority); see also Washington Data 
Res., 704 F.3d at 1326 (explaining the two sources of authority FTC uses to 
obtain public compensation and affirming an award under statutory injunctive 
power).  
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SEC began to seek disgorgement of illegal profits under its 
statutory injunctive powers in the 1970s, although it only later 
distributed these funds to investors.67 In 1990, Congress recog-
nized the agency’s use of public compensation and authorized it 
to promulgate rules for the distribution of these funds.68 Con-
gress then created the Federal Account for Investor Restitution 
(FAIR) Funds authority,69 which permits distribution to inves-
tors of civil penalties levied by the SEC against the defendant, 
along with disgorged funds from the same enforcement action.70  
Some statutory schemes authorize multiple government 
enforcers to obtain public compensation. For instance, state at-
torneys general have power parallel with federal agencies to 
enforce numerous federal consumer protection laws and obtain 
public compensation, although states infrequently use most of 
this federal authority.71  
Very few of these statutes impose procedural requirements 
on the use of public compensation authority. The most promi-
nent are in the Clayton Act’s authorization for state recovery of 
antitrust damages.72 In addition, the SEC has adopted rules 
prescribing some procedures to guide its public compensation. 
SEC staff are required to develop a public plan for the distribu-
tion, which must include the proposed process for notice to and 
claims by investors, and provide a right for investors to com-
ment on the plan.73 A few state attorneys general are permitted 
to seek public compensation through class certification in 
UDAP and antitrust cases.74 The EEOC and some state attor-
 
 67. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded 
Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317, 320–22 (2008).  
 68. Id. at 323–24. 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012). 
 70. Black, supra note 67, at 323–27 (tracing history of SEC “Fair Funds” 
authority). 
 71. Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General’s Use of Con-
current Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 80 (2011) (finding 104 cases raising 120 claims under 
16 federal statutes authorizing state enforcement, but with 2 telemarketing 
statutes accounting for 91 of the 120 claims, with sparse use of all the remain-
ing federal authority).  
 72. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 73. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1101–.1106 (2014). Investors do not have the right to 
intervene in the SEC proceeding. Id. § 201.1106. 
 74. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.910 (2012) (permitted to proceed by 
class); Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1039–40 
(9th Cir. 2014) (noting that there is conflicting statutory authority as to 
whether the state attorney general is required to bring UDAP and antitrust 
actions under class action authority); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Anti-
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neys general must follow pre-complaint restrictions on suit that 
require notice to and engagement with the employer prior to 
suit, but public compensation distribution procedures are on a 
case-by-case basis.75 
3. Parens Patriae Authority 
Commentators have focused a great deal of attention on 
the third type of legal authority used in public compensation 
cases—parens patriae—even though this doctrine in its tradi-
tional form is used sparingly as authority for public compensa-
tion. Scholars and courts agree that the parens doctrine is 
“murky.”76 Parens allows a state to bring suit when it has “qua-
si-sovereign” interests in the enforcement of its civil or criminal 
laws. A key limitation on a parens action is that the state suit 
cannot represent solely private interests. As the Supreme 
Court stated in the seminal modern case explicating the parens 
doctrine, Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, the state’s quasi-
sovereign interests cannot be “private interests pursued by the 
State as a nominal party.”77  
Much of the focus on parens authority arose from the high-
ly publicized litigation against the tobacco industry by state at-
torneys general in the 1990s, and later cases brought against 
other controversial industries, including gun and lead paint 
manufacturers.78 None of these cases, however, involved public 
compensation. Rather, the states sought to enjoin conduct and 
 
trust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 387–88 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that eight states 
properly sought antitrust indirect purchaser relief through class action rules); 
Celebrezze v. Hughes, 479 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Ohio 1985) (noting that the attor-
ney general may bring a class action but is not required to do so to obtain res-
titution). But see Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Lubin, 222 S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. 2007) 
(holding that a state attorney general cannot maintain a class action in the 
absence of a class representative). 
 75. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 55, § 13.4.1 (state attorneys general); 
Morrison, supra note 38, at 124–31 (EEOC). 
 76. Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1850 
(2000) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967)). For an exhaustive history 
of the parens doctrine, see Jay Himes, State Parens Patriae Authority (2004) 
(prepared for Institute for Law & Economic Policy Symposium on Protecting 
the Public). 
 77. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 
(1982). 
 78. Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use 
of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 1921 (2000) 
(state attorneys general can use flexible proof in seeking damages under fed-
eral Clayton Act). 
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obtain recompense for the state treasuries rather than compen-
sation for purchasers or victims of the products.79  
State attorneys general actively use parens authority for 
public compensation mostly in a statutorily authorized form of 
the doctrine in one aspect of their antitrust enforcement, which 
presents unique issues discussed in the following subpart. 
Some of the federal consumer protection statutes authorizing 
parallel state enforcement also refer to parens authority.80 It is 
not clear that a statute including the term “parens” in authoriz-
ing public compensation restricts the authority of the govern-
ment enforcer compared to other forms of express statutory au-
thority.81 
Government enforcers rarely rely on common law parens 
doctrine for public compensation.82 Federal agencies generally 
have been found to lack authority to employ parens to imply a 
right of action or remedy.83 No empirical research has estab-
lished how often state attorneys general use common law 
parens authority for public compensation, but there is little 
reason for most state attorneys general to invoke this doctrine 
given their statutory authority, and it appears to be an infre-
 
 79. Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, 
Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 30–35 (2000); William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of 
Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. 
L. REV. 1885, 1901–03 (2000). 
 80. Compare Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1640(e) (2012) (explaining that enforcement actions for violations “may also 
be brought by the appropriate State attorney general”), with Controlling the 
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act of 
2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f)(a) (2012) (“[T]he attorney general, official, or agency 
of the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of the resi-
dents of the State . . . .”). State statutes authorizing public compensation out-
side of antitrust occasionally incorporate a parens reference. 
 81. In a suit by state attorneys general against Apple, Inc. for antitrust 
violations in the sale of electronic books, a court recently rejected an argument 
that Due Process requires the states to proceed under class action rules. In re 
Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 14 F. Supp. 3d 525, 535–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The 
court noted that parens authority in this statutory context was different than 
common law parens, and also held that any questions of prudential standing 
by the states under the parens doctrine were unavailable when Congress stat-
utorily authorized the parens action. Id. 
 82. The term “common law parens” is used here to mean a non-statutory 
use of the parens doctrine. It should be noted, however, that the parens doc-
trine has roots in both common law and equity. See generally Himes, supra 
note 76. 
 83. Davis, supra note 7, at 24. 
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quent occurrence.84 Even when state attorneys general use the 
common law parens doctrine for public compensation, it can be 
intertwined with statutory authority.85 
4. The Special Case of State Antitrust Enforcement 
State attorney general antitrust enforcement differs from 
other areas of public compensation in its origin and its proce-
dural regime. State antitrust and unfair competition laws gen-
erally track federal antitrust laws.86 Local bid-rigging conduct 
and mergers of local health care providers are typical subjects 
of local market antitrust enforcement under state law.87 But 
state attorneys general also have an important place in nation-
al antitrust enforcement. They are the only governmental enti-
ties with the ability to seek damages, including treble damages, 
for antitrust violations under both federal and state law.88  
The federal statutory authority arose out of failed attempts 
by the states to use their common law parens authority to ob-
tain damages in national antitrust cases. In 1972, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. that states 
could sue for injunctive relief to restrain antitrust violations us-
ing parens authority, but that state quasi-sovereign interests 
did not authorize states to seek damages for state citizens for 
the same antitrust violations.89 In 1976, Congress responded by 
amending the Clayton Act, one of two primary federal antitrust 
laws, to authorize state attorneys general to “bring a civil ac-
tion in the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of 
natural persons residing in such State . . . to secure monetary 
 
 84. Ratliff, supra note 76, at 1865 (observing “sparse” use of parens in 
consumer protection area). 
 85. The Minnesota Attorney General, for example, has relied on common 
law parens in seeking public compensation, but Minnesota courts have mixed 
citations to parens authority with cases basing public compensation on statu-
tory injunctive relief. State ex rel. Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 
N.W.2d 888, 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993). 
The primary enforcement statute used by the Minnesota Attorney General 
later was amended to recognize the existence of public compensation as a rem-
edy and to provide ancillary authority for its administration. MINN. STAT. 
§ 8.31 subdiv. 2(c) (2014) (providing that undistributed public compensation 
can be paid to the public treasury); id. at subdiv. 3(c) (authorizing appoint-
ment of administrator for public compensation).  
 86. AM. BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SEVENTH) 633–34 
(2012). 
 87. Conners, supra note 16, at 43–46, 51–52. 
 88. Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust En-
forcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673, 682–84 (2003). 
 89. 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
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relief.”90 Unlike federal enforcement agencies, states can obtain 
treble damages for antitrust violations under this authority.91 
Congress added this statutory parens authority substantially 
because of a concern that injured consumers were unable to ob-
tain compensation either through federal agency actions or pri-
vate class actions given adverse decisional law complicating 
class certification when individual consumer injury is small 
and injured consumers difficult to identify.92 In recognition of 
this diffuse injury problem, Congress allowed the states to ob-
tain consumer recovery using loosened standards of proof for 
damages.93  
Congress also established procedures for state enforcement 
under the Clayton Act that are similar to a class action but 
more flexible. The Clayton Act requires notice by state attor-
neys general to potential consumer recipients—at least by pub-
lication or directly to consumers as needed “according to the 
circumstances of the case” if the court determines that notice 
“solely by publication would deny due process of law.”94 Con-
sumers have the right to opt out of inclusion in the state attor-
ney general action, but uniquely in the area of public compen-
sation, the Clayton Act provides for statutory preclusion of 
claims when the consumer does not exercise opt-out rights.95 
Settlement requires judicial review and further notice prior to 
effectuation of statutory preclusion.96  
The less rigorous requirements for proving damages and 
the more flexible notice and review procedures represent a leg-
islative choice to establish an alternative public scheme to pri-
vate class actions for certain antitrust violations.97 The focus on 
 
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2012).  
 91. Id. § 15c(a)(2). 
 92. New York ex rel. Vacco v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 
1996) (“Congress empowered state attorneys general to investigate and prose-
cute antitrust abuses on behalf of consumers stymied by Rule 23’s certification 
and notification hurdles.”); Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Labor-
atories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by 
State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 376–79 (1999). 
 93. Farmer, supra note 92, at 381–82. 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1). 
 95. Id. § 15c(b)(2)–(3). 
 96. Id. § 15c(c); see Farmer, supra note 92, at 383–85 (describing proce-
dures for state enforcement under the Clayton Act and observing that the “no-
tice and claim preclusion provisions of the statute are as creative as the sec-
tion on estimation of damages”). 
 97. See Farmer, supra note 92, at 381, 383; First, supra note 27, at 1005–
13. 
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compensation as a defining characteristic of state antitrust en-
forcement suits under the Clayton Act, and the preclusive effect 
and procedural requirements in the Act give this type of action 
a different character than other public enforcement actions. As 
a result, some aspects of the relationship between public com-
pensation and private rights present differently in state anti-
trust enforcement compared to other forms of public compensa-
tion—a point that recurs in this Article.98 
5. Summary of Public Compensation Legal Authority 
Almost all public compensation is based on some form of 
statutory authority. The following chart shows the authority 
used by various government enforcers to obtain public compen-
sation. The larger oval represents a form of legal authority 
based wholly or partly in statute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of public compensation authority. 
 
 
 98. Antitrust enforcement is further complicated by the fact that federal 
law allows for damages only to “direct purchasers” from the antitrust violator. 
State law, however, allows for damages to “indirect purchasers,” such as buy-
ers of a breakfast cereal who paid slightly higher prices for the product be-
cause suppliers of an input into the product engaged in price collusion that 
raised the prices of those inputs to cereal manufacturers. Waller, supra note 
30, at 218–19. The state law authority for public compensation with indirect 
purchaser suits varies, with sixteen states providing express statutory author-
ity, fourteen states providing for a statutory grant of parens authority similar 
to the Clayton Act, thirteen states relying on some combination of judicial in-
terpretation of statutory and common law authority, and eight states using a 
class action mechanism. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 
F.R.D. 369, 386–88 (D.D.C. 2002).  
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II.  THE CRITIQUE OF PUBLIC COMPENSATION   
In 1969, John Wade and Robert Kamenshine published an 
article analyzing whether and when public compensation 
should be awarded.99 Wade and Kamenshine generally lauded 
the potential for public compensation and urged, along with 
U.S. Senator Warren Magnuson, that “[t]his method would 
vindicate not only the interests of those already defrauded, but 
hopefully would also deter unscrupulous businessmen from 
pursuing new schemes.”100 After decades of scholarly silence, 
most recent commentators reach a less favorable evaluation. 
This Part begins with the observation of recent scholarship that 
public compensation cases “mimic” class action cases and that 
the two types of cases raise similar concerns as to adequate 
representation of and consent by recipients. The second subpart 
examines one particular branch of scholarship for which the re-
lationship between private rights and public compensation is 
central—the assertion that public compensation precludes the 
rights of compensated individuals to bring a later private ac-
tion.  
A. SIMILARITIES IN THE SCHOLARLY CRITIQUE 
The commonality in most of the recent scholarly critiques 
of public compensation is three observations. First, these schol-
ars note the similarities between public compensation and 
monetary recovery in class action cases. Both types of actions 
return money to groups of people, leading to observations that 
public compensation “mimics,” “mirrors,”101 or “bears a striking 
resemblance”102 to class action cases. Not only do these actions 
superficially look the same, but according to these scholars pub-
lic compensation cases “perform the same job”103 or “serve the 
 
 99. Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 17, at 1031. Student commentators 
of the period opined on the authority of specific government entities to obtain 
such relief. See, e.g., Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Viola-
tion of Rule 10b-5, 79 HARV. L. REV. 656 (1966); Allan Jergesen, Note, New 
York City’s Alternative to the Consumer Class Action: The Government as Rob-
in Hood, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301, 307 (1972); Restitution in Food and Drug 
Enforcement, 4 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1952). 
 100. Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 17, at 1050. 
 101. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 519; see also Max Minzner, Should 
Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2153 (2015) (observing that agency 
actions obtaining restitution “mirror class actions in both their goals and their 
overall structure”). 
 102. Lemos, supra note 7, at 487. 
 103. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 506 (“[A]gencies should adopt rules 
from representative litigation, like those that govern class action settlements, 
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same aggregative function as private damages class actions.”104 
Public compensation has been labeled an “agency class ac-
tion”105 or “‘executive branch’ class action,”106 and the govern-
ment enforcer has been called “public class counsel.”107 
Second, these scholars describe the lesser procedural re-
quirements for public compensation compared to class ac-
tions.108 Class actions require notice to class members, allow for 
objections by class members to settlement terms, permit class 
members to opt out of the litigation and provide for judicial re-
view of a settlement.109 In contrast, these scholars correctly note 
that public compensation often occurs without most or all of 
these procedural rights,110 and that when these procedures ap-
ply to public compensation they usually are less rigorous.111  
The third observation is that government enforcers neither 
adequately represent the interests of the recipients of relief nor 
have procedures to involve recipients in the distribution of re-
lief. According to these critiques, public officials and compensa-
tion recipients have multiple conflicting interests, such as the 
government’s interest in receiving funds,112 the “political ambi-
tions” of an elected official113 and influence of campaign finance 
donors,114 reputational concerns of the agency,115 capture of a 
 
when agencies, in effect, perform the same job.”). 
 104. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 510. 
 105. Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 1992. 
 106. Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corrective Justice State, 5 J. TORT L. 189, 
191 (2012). 
 107. See generally Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensa-
tion of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103 (2008). 
 108. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 520 (“[M]ost agency settlements af-
ford only the most minimal level of process.”). 
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), 23(d)(1)(B), 23(e)(1) (notice to class members); 
id. at 23(e)(5) (right of class members to object to settlement); id. at 23(e) (ju-
dicial review and approval of settlement required). 
 110. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 499–511; Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 
553–71 (considering three potential reforms of multidistrict coordination, ne-
gotiated rulemaking, and judicial hard look review). 
 111. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 2016–34. 
 112. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 513; see also Davis, supra note 7. 
 113. See Adam S. Zimmerman, Mass Settlement Rivalries, 82 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 381, 392 (2013) (noting conflicts between different victims “may pale in 
comparison” to conflicts with “[p]olitically ambitious attorneys general”); see 
also Davis, supra note 7, at 46. 
 114. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 515 (arguing that corporate donors who do 
not want injured citizens to receive maximum recoveries donate to attorney 
general election campaign funds). 
 115. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 551 (suggesting agencies sometimes 
settle matters to resolve embarrassing missteps); see also Davis, supra note 7, 
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regulatory agency by the interests of the regulated entity,116 the 
use of private counsel on contract with their own financial in-
terests,117 and an interest in the jobs of those working for the 
defendant.118 These critics also conclude that government en-
forcers provide insufficient notice of and opportunity to partici-
pate in public compensation cases and fail to involve potential 
recipients in the size or shape of public compensation.119  
These observations beget a conclusion—that the lesser pro-
cedural protections in public compensation are not justified by 
the differences in compensation outcomes between public en-
forcement and private aggregate litigation. Class action proce-
dures are designed to protect the interests of the class mem-
bers. Notice and rights to object or opt out exist to reflect, as 
much as possible in private aggregate litigation, the consent of 
the class members to participation in the litigation.120 Judicial 
review of class actions exists, in part, to ensure that the class 
counsel and the representative plaintiff adequately represent 
the interests of class members.121 The critics argue that apply-
ing class action procedures to public compensation would help 
resolve the observed conflicts of interest of public officials with 
the recipients of compensation and the lack of participation 
rights for recipients.122 
B. CONCERN THAT PUBLIC COMPENSATION VIOLATES DUE  
PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
Scholarly critics argue that a lack of procedural require-
ments for public compensation results in inadequate or unfair 
 
at 46 (contending that political ambitions may skew enforcement priorities). 
 116. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 551–53. 
 117. See Davis, supra note 7, at 46; Lemos, supra note 7, at 515–16 (con-
tending that private counsel have personal incentives to maximize the recov-
ery for the class because the attorneys’ fees increase as the clients’ recovery 
grows). 
 118. See Lemos, supra note 7, at 513–14 (noting that a large recovery for 
the consumers of the parens patriae group may put the defendant out of busi-
ness). 
 119. See id. at 519–20; Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 546–49. 
 120. 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1786 (3d ed. 2005). 
 121. John Coffee famously described the agency cost problems that arise in 
class action litigation because class members cannot, or lack incentives to, 
control class counsel conduct. Morris Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class 
Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757, 763–74 (2012) (describing Coffee’s cri-
tique). 
 122. Davis, supra note 7, at 41; Lemos, supra note 7, at 548. 
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distributions to recipients of public compensation.123 The article 
by Lemos compels particular attention because it argues that 
the purported problems with public compensation rise to the 
level of possible constitutional deprivations. 
Lemos examines state attorneys general enforcement and 
asserts that public compensation in these state cases precludes 
later assertion of private claims for monetary relief.124 She con-
tends that “[a]lthough the case law on the preclusive effect of 
public aggregate litigation is surprisingly sparse, the prevailing 
view is that the judgment in a state case is binding ‘on every 
person whom the state represents . . . .’”125 Consistent with the 
assumption that public compensation is the functional equiva-
lent of class action relief, Lemos asserts that state attorneys 
general represent the recipients of public compensation and 
thus that public compensation precludes a later private claim 
for monetary relief.126 Lemos argues that conflicts of interest 
are “more stark”127 and the prospects for client monitoring “are 
even darker”128 in state public compensation cases compared to 
class action cases.  
Putting together these assertions, Lemos concludes that 
public compensation raises constitutional Due Process concerns 
because state attorneys general do not adequately represent 
 
 123. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 2007; Zimmerman, 
supra note 7, at 500; Zimmerman, supra note 106, at 219. Another branch of 
scholarship on public compensation is limited to investor recovery in securities 
cases. This scholarship does not strictly follow the pattern described above and 
is largely concerned with coordination of public and private actions. Verity 
Winship argues that SEC public compensation should focus on cases in which 
private actions are not feasible. Winship, supra note 107, at 1141–45. The 
Velikonja study establishes that this is largely the approach taken by the SEC 
and its public compensation is appropriately adequate in amount. Velikonja, 
supra note 35, at 338; see also Black, supra note 67 (arguing that the SEC 
generally should refrain from seeking public compensation to efficiently use 
resources and not hinder private actions); Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 556–
63 (focusing largely on SEC cases in discussing coordination of public compen-
sation and private enforcement). For a particularly thoughtful examination of 
the relationship of public and private enforcement, see David Freeman 
Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913 (2014). 
 124. Lemos, supra note 7, at 500. 
 125. Id. Lemos similarly states: “Case law on parens patriae preclusion is 
remarkably thin, but the consensus view seems to be that public suits pre-
clude all private actions raising the same claims.” Id. at 531. 
 126. Lemos, supra note 7, at 535. 
 127. Id. at 530. 
 128. Id. at 519. 
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the interests of public compensation recipients.129 Lemos pro-
poses that states remedy these purported constitutional con-
cerns by either adopting laws providing that preclusion does 
not result from public compensation, or creating procedures 
similar to a class action when state attorneys general seek pub-
lic compensation.130 Other scholars also have raised concerns 
about public compensation precluding later private claims for 
monetary relief without adequate representation of compensa-
tion recipients.131 
III.  PRECLUSION, PUBLIC COMPENSATION, AND FALSE 
ALARM   
The starting point for understanding the relationship be-
tween public compensation and private rights is determining 
whether public compensation precludes later assertion of pri-
vate rights for monetary relief. The case law is reasonably clear 
that public compensation generally does not result in preclu-
 
 129. Id. at 531–42. 
 130. Id. at 542–48. 
 131. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 1855, 1924 (2015) (“Precluding private suits in the wake of a parens 
patriae action can be particularly problematic since those suits have not been 
subjected to Rule 23’s adequacy requirement and attorneys general may prior-
itize political agendas and quick resolution over private claimants’ interests.”). 
Seth Davis analyzes the broader question of government use of an implied 
right of action in the absence of express statutory authority. Davis identifies 
four types of such implied actions, including the category of “substitute suits,” 
which includes actions seeking public compensation. Davis, supra note 7, at 
22–24. Davis asserts that these suits preclude later private claims and ob-
serves that this result is at odds with the procedural protections in class ac-
tions. Thus, these suits “may wrest control of private rights from an individual 
beneficiary without the procedures that protect a beneficiary’s right to her day 
in court.” Id. at 41 (“[W]hile the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe 
mechanisms to ensure adequate representation in class actions, no such 
mechanisms apply to substitute suits.”). Davis makes substantially similar 
observations and conclusions as the new scholarship about the equivalence of 
public and private purpose and the inadequacy of representation by state at-
torneys general in “substitute suits” because of conflicting interests with the 
recipients of public relief. Id. at 42. Davis presumes in his analysis that public 
enforcement actions preclude both injunctive remedies and public compensa-
tion. Id. He later considers and rejects the option of limiting preclusion of pri-
vate claims to injunctive relief as a means of addressing the problem. Id.; see 
also Verity Winship, Policing Compensatory Relief in Agency Settlements, 82 
U. CIN. L. REV. 551 (2013) (arguing that public compensation should be avoid-
ed when individuals are precluded from bringing claims). Winship observes, 
however, that preclusion does not apply to private actions following SEC en-
forcement. Id. at 556. 
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sion of private claims for monetary relief.132 Accordingly, con-
cerns about Due Process protections for recipients are mis-
placed. The first subpart looks at judicial decisions and litiga-
tion practice bearing on the preclusive effect of public 
compensation on subsequently asserted private claims, an 
analysis not systematically undertaken in the prior scholar-
ship. The Lemos article gets this basic proposition wrong. The 
second subpart examines the reasons underlying this error, 
which leads to a broader discussion of how and when public 
compensation should occur. 
A. GENERAL RULE OF NON-PRECLUSION 
As Edward Cooper succinctly states, “[t]he central proposi-
tion that a party is bound (by a prior result) is balanced by the 
rule that ordinarily nonparties are not bound.”133 Because an 
enforcement action is public in nature and brought by the gov-
ernment, public compensation cannot preclude a later action by 
a private beneficiary of that relief unless an exception to this 
principle applies. Existing case law and litigation practice is 
sufficiently clear to conclude that public compensation general-
ly does not preclude later private suits for monetary relief. 
1. Case Law on Preclusion of Subsequent Private Actions 
In General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reached the conclusion that public compensation ob-
tained by the EEOC does not “bind” the recipients of that com-
pensation in later private suits.134 The EEOC accused General 
Telephone Company of gender discrimination by restricting 
maternity leave and access to jobs and promotions for a large 
group of women in four western states, and it sought injunctive 
relief and backpay as remedies in its enforcement action.135 
General Telephone argued that the EEOC should be required 
to use class action procedures to obtain public compensation in 
the form of backpay.136 The Court rejected this argument, not-
ing that an EEOC enforcement action did not act as a “proxy” 
 
 132. See infra Part III.A. 
 133. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 4448 (2d ed. 1987). The limited boundaries of nonparty preclusion was em-
phasized in the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the “theory of virtual repre-
sentation.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008). 
 134. 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980). 
 135. Id. at 319–21. 
 136. Id. at 321. 
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for the employees for whom it sought relief.137 Rather, the 
EEOC sought to “vindicate the public interest in preventing 
employment discrimination,” even when seeking public com-
pensation.138  
The Court then directly addressed the preclusion issue. It 
observed that General Telephone’s objective in seeking the use 
of the class procedures was to obtain the preclusive effect of a 
class.139 The Court treated the matter as one of statutory inter-
pretation.140 It found that mandating preclusion would conflict 
with the intent of Congress in prohibiting gender discrimina-
tion and providing wide discretion for trial courts to exercise 
equitable powers to achieve this result, especially given “the 
possible differences between the public and private interests 
involved.”141 The Court observed that a trial court could order 
that individuals be required to choose to release claims as a 
condition of receiving public compensation if appropriate in a 
given case, stating that the “Title VII remedy is an equitable 
one; a court of equity should adjust the relief accordingly.”142 
EEOC public compensation, therefore, has been found not pre-
clusive of later private claims.143  
Three years prior to the decision in General Telephone, the 
California Supreme Court had reached an identical result in an 
action brought by the California Attorney General. In People v. 
Pacific Land Research, the defendants created and sold subdi-
vided real estate parcels without proper notice to the California 
Real Estate Commissioner and by use of unfair and deceptive 
practices.144 The California Attorney General brought an action 
under express statutory authority and sought the familiar troi-
ka of remedies—injunctive relief, civil penalties, and restitu-
tion.145 Defendants argued that the state should comply with 
class action procedures when seeking restitution for a group of 
 
 137. Id. at 326. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 332. 
 140. Id. at 330. 
 141. Id. at 333. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Circuit court decisions in the wake of General Telephone have made 
this result clear. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 4458.1 n.9 (collecting 
cases in which preclusion was denied); see also EEOC v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 216 
F. Supp. 2d 935, 938–39 (D. Minn. 2002) (extending General Telephone holding 
to EEOC enforcement under the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 144. 569 P.2d 125, 127 (Cal. 1977). 
 145. Id. at 127–28. 
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purchasers, that this relief should be preceded by notice to the 
purchaser group, and that the result as to restitution in the 
public action should be binding on the purchasers.146 
In rejecting this argument, the California Supreme Court 
noted that its decision might result in an advantage to the land 
purchasers because they could benefit from the state action 
without relinquishing rights to a later private action, but that 
“[t]hese consequences flow not from any inherent unfairness in 
the procedures but because the People’s action is fundamental-
ly for the benefit of the public even though founded upon the 
same violations of law which form the basis of the (private) 
claim for restitution.”147 Relying on Pacific Land Research, a 
California appellate court later held that public compensation 
resulting from a public enforcement action for deception in sale 
of a job training program did not bar later claims for monetary 
relief by private plaintiffs.148  
There are two exceptions to the general rule that public 
compensation is not preclusive of subsequent private actions for 
damages.149 First, the Clayton Act provides for preclusive effect 
in the special circumstance of state antitrust enforcement of 
 
 146. Id. at 128–32. 
 147. Id. at 130. 
 148. Payne v. Nat’l Collection Sys., Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 260, 266 (Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 149. Although not technically preclusion, “required release” public compen-
sation, in which the government enforcer enters into a settlement or a court 
orders that a recipient must execute a release of private claims to obtain pub-
lic compensation, results in preclusion for those who accept public compensa-
tion. See infra Part V.B. The use of an opt-in public compensation procedure is 
consistent with no preclusive effect absent the opt-in process, and courts have 
refused to find a release of claims by consumers who do not opt-in to public 
compensation. Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Grp., Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the employee who refused compensation under 
EEOC consent decree that required her to release claims to obtain compensa-
tion was not precluded from bringing private action for monetary relief); State 
v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 345 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (holding 
that the land purchasers who refused public compensation accompanied by 
release were not precluded). Also, preclusion can apply when the EEOC seeks 
victim-specific relief rather than public compensation, but even in these cases 
courts have split as to the preclusive effect of EEOC enforcement. Compare 
Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Grp., Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(holding no preclusion even though “the EEOC’s suit against Cerro was based 
solely on Riddle’s charge of discrimination; it did not involve a class of employ-
ees or an allegation of pattern and practice discrimination”), with Adams v. 
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 697 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (reversing 
appellate panel and finding no private right of action when EEOC reached 
consent decree as to named employees). 
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federal law.150 Second, a small number of enforcement cases by 
state attorneys general proceed as class actions, with the result 
that preclusion applies in this circumstance.151 In one state, 
Alaska, courts have held that public compensation under state 
law must be obtained by the application of a form of class ac-
tion rules, including notice and opt-out rights, and resulting in 
preclusive effect on later private claims.152 In both of these ex-
ceptional circumstances, government enforcers must comply 
with stricter procedural protections to obtain public compensa-
tion. 
2. Litigation Practice Reflects Non-Preclusion 
That subsequent private actions for monetary relief gener-
ally are not precluded following public compensation is con-
sistent with observed litigation practice. Two common types of 
cases are in conflict with the assertion that public compensa-
tion has a preclusive impact—“coattail” class actions, and class 
certification review subsequent to public compensation.153  
 
 150. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 151. See supra note 74. 
 152. State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 416 (Alaska 
1982). The court found that an award of public compensation generally re-
quires that the Alaska Attorney General follow procedures analogous to Rule 
23. Id. at 416–17. The court also imposes preclusive effect on later private 
claims for monetary relief, but held that use of an opt-in procedure would be 
sufficient in that case. Id. at 417. The court’s decision appears to be an isolated 
result, even from the case law in other states extant at the time. As its only 
authority for the decision, the Alaska court cited an early decision interpreting 
New Jersey law providing for public compensation, Kugler v. Romain, 279 
A.2d 640, 649 (N.J. 1971), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in 
passing that public compensation is “in the nature of a class action.” Id. at 
416. In People v. Pacific Land Research Co., which had been decided before the 
First National Bank of Anchorage decision, the California Supreme Court also 
cited this quote from Kugler and observed that “the matter was settled the fol-
lowing year” by New Jersey courts holding that its Attorney General was not 
required to use class action procedures. 569 P.2d 125, 131 n.10 (Cal. 1977).  
 153. Of course, individuals cannot obtain a double recovery through a later 
private suit. The later private suit can only recover the difference between the 
consumer’s loss and the amount of public compensation received by the con-
sumer. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) (“It also goes without 
saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individ-
ual.”); SEC v. Risman, 7 F. App’x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In administering the 
disgorgement fund, the SEC will be under obligation to ensure that payments 
to victims are not made in a manner that would duplicate compensation.”); see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a) (2012) (excluding recovery by a state for a Clayton Act 
antitrust claim if it “duplicates amounts which have been awarded for the 
same injury”). 
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“Coattail” class actions are private class actions using the 
information revealed or result obtained in public enforcement 
cases to seek private relief.154 These class actions seek damages 
following cases where public compensation was sought or 
awarded, which is a result at odds with preclusion of a later 
private action when public compensation was awarded.155 An 
exhaustive study of SEC public compensation cases from 2002 
through 2013 found that in 46.8% (108 of 231) of these cases a 
parallel class action also obtained a monetary settlement.156 
When parallel SEC and private actions obtained compensation 
for investors, the private actions recovered over $39 billion, 
which accounted for 59% of total investor recovery.157 The same 
situation occurs in other regulatory areas.158 In discussing pre-
clusion of coattail class actions by public enforcement, Howard 
Erichson observes that “[r]estricting private claims would gen-
erally require legislative action, so such restrictions cannot 
simply be offered by a negotiating government lawyer.”159  
A related circumstance inconsistent with preclusion is 
when courts determine whether to certify a class action seeking 
monetary relief given the existence of public compensation. The 
typical putative class seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), 
which requires a court finding that “a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.”160 Class action defendants have argued that 
class certification is improper following public compensation 
because the class action mechanism is not superior to individu-
al claims given prior public compensation. Courts have both 
denied and certified class actions in response to these argu-
ments.161 These class certification motions would make no sense 
if courts regularly precluded subsequent private claims. In fact, 
 
 154. Erichson, supra note 79, at 5; see Velikonja, supra note 35, at 368. 
 155. Erichson, supra note 79, at 6. 
 156. Velikonja, supra note 35, at 369. 
 157. Id. at 342–47; see also Winship, supra note 131, at 556 (“[S]ettlement 
for monetary relief in an SEC action generally does not preclude other actions 
by injured investors.”). 
 158. See, e.g., In re First Databank Antitrust Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 96 
(D.D.C. 2002) (illustrating a case in which a class obtained additional relief 
following FTC antitrust enforcement action).  
 159. Erichson, supra note 79, at 30. Erichson recounts the attempt by some 
state attorneys general to have Congress pass legislation to preclude private 
claims against tobacco manufacturers. Id. 
 160. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDER-
AL PRACTICE § 23.46[2][c] (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 1999). 
 161. See infra Part V.A. 
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courts in these cases have specifically noted the lack of preclu-
sion of private claims in deciding these motions.162 
3. Public Relief Preclusion Following Public Enforcement  
Private rights can be extinguished following an enforce-
ment action without regard to public compensation, but only as 
to the public relief sought in the subsequent private action, not 
as to private damages claims. The exact line between public 
and private relief is not precise, but the ends of the continuum 
are clear enough. Courts generally do not allow private actions 
to proceed if the relief sought changes the terms of an injunc-
tion or required conduct to remedy a public resource or problem 
resulting from the enforcement action. Courts allow a later pri-
vate action seeking monetary relief, with the sometimes excep-
tion of punitive damages.  
Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc. offers a clear 
example of this result in applying common law preclusion to 
private claims following a public enforcement action.163 The 
Satsky plaintiffs were property owners near a mine that had 
long discharged toxic waste.164 The mine was subject to envi-
ronmental cleanup under a consent decree following litigation 
in which the State of Colorado asserted liability of the mine 
owner under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act.165 The plaintiffs 
sought multiple types of relief, including various types of dam-
ages and an injunction.166 The defendant mine owner argued 
that the government consent decree precluded later private 
claims.167 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that preclu-
sion doctrines barred claims “based on injuries to the natural 
resources held by the State of Colorado” but permitted claims 
for “purely private interests,” and remanded to the district 
court to distinguish among the many remedies sought by the 
plaintiffs.168  
 
 162. See, e.g., Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 212 (9th Cir. 
1975) (stating that one factor in denying class certification was that “[n]o 
member of the class is barred from initiating a suit on his own behalf”). 
 163. 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).  
 164. Id. at 1465. 
 165. Id. at 1467. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1470. The court held that neither the parens doctrine nor federal 
environmental law allowed the state to assert purely private interests. The 
State of Colorado appeared amicus curiae in support of the plaintiff’s position 
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Numerous commentators have noted that public enforce-
ment actions have a differing preclusive effect based on the 
type of relief sought in the later private suit.169 There are gray 
areas, of course. Courts have, for instance, allowed private par-
ties to litigate claims for injunctive relief in the face of a con-
sent decree obtained by a federal antitrust enforcer,170 yet pre-
cluded punitive damages claims brought by private parties 
following a government action. 
This latter situation is illustrated well by private actions 
brought in the wake of the 1990s settlement of lawsuits by 
state attorneys general against tobacco companies. The settle-
ment between state attorneys general and the tobacco compa-
nies released state claims for civil penalties and punitive dam-
ages.171 In the private actions that followed, courts reached 
differing results as to preclusion of punitive damages claims 
depending on whether the court characterized the purpose of 
punitive damages under state law as deterrence for the public 
good or to compensate private injury.172 Even the courts that 
 
that it did not represent plaintiffs’ private interests in the prior public en-
forcement litigation. See also Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 119 So. 3d 497, 
503–04 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 131 So. 3d 787 (Fla. 2013) 
(holding that plaintiffs barred from seeking injunctive relief against cemetery 
following public action for licensing violations that obtained injunctive relief 
and operational changes, but “plaintiffs are not barred from seeking damag-
es”). 
 169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 illus. 6–7 (AM. LAW INST. 
1982) (stating that a taxpayer suit to challenge restrictions on the statutorily 
permissible operations of a charity would be precluded by a prior state attor-
ney general action, but a suit by an employee for “relief for himself” can pro-
ceed in the face of a prior government suit resulting in injunctive relief to re-
strain illegal employment practices); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. B(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (concluding that in 
parens cases, “governmental action on a general interest cannot preclude a 
private-damages action brought to obtain compensation for a loss”); 18A 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 4458.1 (“In most circumstances . . . it should 
be presumed that public enforcement actions are not intended to foreclose tra-
ditional common-law claims or private remedies expressly created by stat-
ute.”).  
 170. In Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961), the 
Court refused to allow intervention under a prior iteration of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 42 by a group of smaller publishers in a federal antitrust en-
forcement action against larger publishers because the smaller publishers 
could pursue injunctive relief in the face of a consent decree in the government 
action. The Court stated that it is “fully settled that a person whose private 
interests coincide with the public interest in government antitrust litigation is 
nonetheless not bound by the eventuality of such litigation.” Id. at 689. 
 171. See Erichson, supra note 79, at 9–16 (explaining how state action 
against the tobacco industry paved the way for private action). 
 172. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81 
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found punitive damages claims precluded as public relief made 
it clear that state attorneys general acting under common law 
parens authority could not release private claims for compensa-
tion due to injuries from smoking. As the Georgia Supreme 
Court stated, for purposes of preclusion in a private suit follow-
ing a state parens action, “the State and its citizens can be priv-
ies . . . only with regard to public claims; they cannot be privies 
with regard to private claims.”173  
B. THE FALSE SCHOLARLY ALARM  
The above law and practice cannot be squared with the as-
sertion in the Lemos article that—as a result of the “prevailing 
view”174 of courts that private claims are precluded following 
public compensation in state attorneys general cases without 
appropriate procedural protections—new and onerous proce-
dural requirements for public compensation are the constitu-
tional “price of preclusion.”175 The scope of inquiry in the Lemos 
article, and similarly defined here, is a public action “that seeks 
to remedy or prevent unlawful activity by obtaining some form 
of direct financial relief for injured citizens.”176 The concern over 
preclusion resulting from these actions, therefore, must focus 
on situations in which an injured private plaintiff was barred 
from litigating a claim for financial relief as a result of a public 
enforcement action. Such cases, surprisingly, are absent in the 
article.177 Because no judicial decision holds that preclusion of 
 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3043, 3075–78 (2013) (describing varying results as to pre-
clusion of punitive damages claims in coattail class actions following state at-
torneys general actions against tobacco companies).  
 173. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549 (2006); 
see also Curtis v. Altria Grp., Inc., 813 N.W.2d 891, 904 (Minn. 2012). Curtis 
turns the preclusion analysis upside down by holding that the state attorney 
general tobacco actions which obtained public relief other than public compen-
sation results in preclusion of a later suit seeking private damages under state 
UDAP laws. This result flows from the broad “public benefit” restriction im-
posed by Minnesota courts, which eliminated private rights of action under 
Minnesota UDAP law following any public enforcement. Id. at 899 (“We have 
previously concluded that the right of a private litigant to bring a lawsuit un-
der subdivision 3a is limited by the authority given the State AG.” (citing Ly v. 
Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 313 (Minn. 2000))). 
 174. Lemos, supra note 7, at 500. 
 175. Id. at 548. 
 176. Id. at 492. 
 177. The cases cited in the article generally did not involve the award of 
public compensation and clearly did not hold that public compensation is pre-
clusive of later private claims for monetary relief absent statutory directive to 
that effect. Lemos references a mid-level Illinois state appellate decision, 
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private monetary relief claims follows public compensation 
from a state attorney general action without procedural protec-
tions similar to a class action, the Lemos article is plainly 
wrong about the prevailing view of courts, especially when that 
assertion is directly contrary to substantial case law and prac-
tice patterns.178 
This error highlights the problem with conceiving of public 
compensation as an abstract practice disconnected from the law 
and context of public enforcement. The first subpart below de-
scribes the error as a consequence of failing to distinguish be-
tween varying legal authority for public compensation. The se-
cond subpart introduces the inapposite use of adequate 
representation as a gauge for structuring public compensation 
without properly placing this remedy in the broader context of 
public enforcement; an idea that is then developed more fully in 
Part IV. 
 
Bonovich v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 310 N.E.2d 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974), 
which held that a private antitrust suit should be dismissed following a deci-
sion at trial for defendants in a parallel action brought by the Illinois Attorney 
General. To the extent this decision has relevance to the issues here, later Illi-
nois state court decisions explicitly reject its reasoning. Jackson v. Callan 
Publ’g, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (rejecting Bonovich as good 
law and reversing dismissal of a private class action of police officers seeking 
equitable relief in the form of a constructive trust); People ex rel. Fahner v. 
Climatemp, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 1096, 1100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“[W]e believe that 
the Bonovich court’s definition of ‘same parties’ is overly broad.”). The decision 
also predates the federal statutory scheme for state attorney general antitrust 
public compensation under federal law adopted in 1976. See supra Part I.B.4.  
 178. This Article does not take the position that it is fully settled law that 
public compensation can never result in preclusion of later private claims in 
any circumstances. Perhaps the best argument that a circumstance exists for 
finding public enforcement precludes later private claims for monetary relief 
would be to focus on a state attorney general enforcement action using only 
common law parens authority and seeking only damages. Even in this scenar-
io, preclusion seems unlikely because a fundamental parens principle is the 
separation of the interests of the state and the interests of the citizens; the 
state must represent “quasi-sovereign” interests, not private interests. Parens 
“does not involve the States stepping in to represent the interests of particular 
citizens who, for whatever reason, cannot represent themselves.” Snapp & Son 
v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). Although this question is 
an all but untraveled side road as to current practice, it might have theoretical 
interest, especially given prominent scholars encouraging state attorneys gen-
eral to bring such cases to fill the enforcement gap caused by judicial limits on 
class actions. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 11. This theoretical potential 
for preclusion, however, is wholly different than the factual assertion by 
Lemos about the prevailing view of courts. That assertion is simply wrong. 
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1. Differences in Authority Explain Preclusion Outcomes 
A careful look at the cited support for Lemos’s assertion 
about preclusion suggests that it can be explained substantially 
by a failure to understand that public compensation has differ-
ent contours under different statutory schemes. The article di-
rectly supports its contention about the prevailing view of 
courts by quoting a law review article discussing solely state 
attorneys general antitrust suits brought under the Clayton 
Act.179 As we have seen, preclusion of private claims following 
state attorney general enforcement under the Clayton Act is 
based in statute and has a unique origin and structure, includ-
ing a requirement of using procedures that comport with Due 
Process, so preclusion in this specific context cannot be general-
ized to other areas of public compensation.180  
The Lemos article also glosses over the different types of 
legal authority under which state attorneys general pursue 
public compensation.181 Although her article acknowledges that 
most state attorneys general enforcement actions proceed un-
der statutory authority,182 it emphasizes the special concerns 
that arise in state use of common law parens authority. A focus 
on common law parens doctrine limits the relevance of the cri-
tique to the broader topic of public compensation because this 
remedy almost always has a statutory basis, in state attorneys 
general cases and other public enforcement actions.183 Yet even 
 
 179. Lemos partially quotes Farmer as part of her formulation of the criti-
cal supposition underlying her argument: “Although the case law on the pre-
clusive effect of public aggregate litigation is surprisingly sparse, the prevail-
ing view is that the judgment in a state case is binding ‘on every person whom 
the state represents . . . .’” Lemos, supra note 7, at 500 (citing Farmer, supra 
note 92, at 384). Farmer, however, was writing solely about the state attorney 
general statutory parens authority in the Clayton Act. Indeed, the entire sen-
tence from which Lemos extracts a clause refers specifically to the notice and 
opt-out rights in the Clayton Act: “Because parens patriae group members are 
presumed to have had notice of the action and an opportunity to opt out of the 
litigation, a judgment is conclusive on every person whom the state represents 
as parens patriae.” Farmer, supra note 92, at 384 (citations omitted). Farmer 
also observes that the Clayton Act procedural requirements “protect the con-
sumers’ constitutional right to be heard.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 180. See supra Part I.B.4; see also In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 14 F. 
Supp. 3d 525, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that Due Process does not necessi-
tate use of class action rules in state antitrust action under the Clayton Act). 
 181. Lemos also sees no reason to differentiate between restitution and 
damages. Lemos, supra note 7, at 498 (“[T]he differences between restitution 
and other monetary damages are immaterial for present purposes . . . .”). 
 182. Lemos, supra note 7, at 497–98.  
 183. See supra Part I.B.  
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with such a narrow emphasis, the article does not identify any 
case in which state attorneys general used common law parens 
authority to obtain public compensation.184  
Instead, the article cites cases, including Satsky, that hold 
private parties are precluded only from seeking injunctive re-
lief.185 Those cases are consistent with the absence of prelusion 
as to public compensation. In fact, several of the judicial deci-
sions cited in the Lemos article explicitly hold that private 
damages claims are not precluded following a public enforce-
ment action.186 
2. Private Interests in Public Enforcement 
The Lemos article cites some of the relevant case law about 
preclusion in discussing purported Due Process concerns about 
adequate representation, rather than using these cases to shed 
light on the predicate question of whether and when private 
claims are precluded following public compensation. The article 
jumps to constitutional concerns with this explanation: 
Such suits blur the lines between public and private, raising difficult 
questions about their effect on subsequent private litigation. The dif-
ficulty stems from the fact that the state clearly does purport to rep-
resent private interests when it seeks damages or restitution on be-
half of injured citizens. The operative question for preclusion 
 
 184. Lemos states that “[d]octrinal puzzles aside, states do use parens 
patriae actions to obtain damages and other monetary remedies for their citi-
zens,” supra note 7, at 497, but cites as support only law review articles dis-
cussing industry-wide cases against tobacco, guns, and lead paint manufac-
turers, which are not public compensation cases. See supra notes 78–79 and 
accompanying text. 
 185. Lemos, supra note 7, at 500 n.55. Lemos also explicates the suits fol-
lowing the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the public enforcement actions of which were 
unrelated to public compensation. Id. at 533–36. Lemos also cites the earlier 
discussed coattail tobacco class actions. Id. at 528.  
 186. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 552 
(Ga. 2006) (“[P]laintiffs’ claim for compensatory damages is of a private, indi-
vidual nature, [but] it cannot be said that plaintiffs and the State are in privi-
ty with respect to such claims.”); Fabiano v. Philip Morris Inc., 862 N.Y.S.2d 
487 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“[I]t is undoubtedly true that plaintiffs’ private 
claims seeking compensation for personal injury could not have been prosecut-
ed by the Attorney General ‘within the parens patriae umbrella,’ the claim as-
serted by them for punitive damages is not similarly disqualified, for punitive 
damages claims are quintessentially and exclusively public in their ultimate 
orientation and purpose.” (citations omitted)); see also Satsky v. Paramount 
Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993); supra notes 163–68 and accom-
panying text. In United States v. Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1301 (N.D. Ala. 
1985), the court severed plaintiffs’ claim for damages from their claim for in-
junctive relief and the finding of preclusion was “directed solely against the 
severed injunctive claim.” Id. at 1304. 
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purposes is thus not whether the state “understood [itself] to be act-
ing in a representative capacity”—plainly it did. Instead, the validity 
of preclusion turns on whether the state representation was constitu-
tionally “adequate.”187 
The statement that state attorneys general “plainly” intend 
to represent private interests in seeking public compensation is 
unsupported in the article and probably often inaccurate. But 
more importantly, the intent of government enforcers is beside 
the point for purposes of determining preclusion. The legal au-
thority for public compensation gives government enforcers the 
right to seek benefit for private individuals within the context 
of public enforcement designed to achieve broader public bene-
fits.188 Whether or not the government enforcer conceives of it-
self as representing the interests of a group of recipients when 
seeking public compensation, it can only seek what it has au-
thority to obtain in a public enforcement action, not all the re-
lief that any individual in the group is entitled to seek in a pri-
vate action. 
It is consistent with preclusion law, therefore, for a gov-
ernment enforcer to take the position that it intends to repre-
sent the private interests of consumers, investors or employees 
in seeking public compensation in a public enforcement action 
and that any public compensation it obtains is not preclusive of 
a later suit for additional recovery by those individuals. The 
FTC took exactly this stance in opposing intervention by a pu-
tative class in a UDAP enforcement action against a seller of 
Bitcoin “mining” equipment.189 
The focus on adequacy of representation as an abstract 
principle in the new scholarly critiques reflects the importance 
ascribed in those critiques to the observation that public com-
pensation looks like a class action case. If public compensation 
is a mimic of a private class action, then it may seem a straight 
line to the conclusion that government enforcers must repre-
sent the private interests of the relief recipients using the same 
 
 187. Lemos, supra note 7, at 535 (footnotes omitted).  
 188. See infra Part IV.A. 
 189. The FTC argued that it adequately protected the interests of the class 
members because “[w]hile all enforcement actions serve a general public inter-
est in deterring violations of the FTC Act and thereby protecting consumers, 
this action also serves the narrower goal of attempting to make the specific 
victims of those violations whole.” Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 26, Alexander 
v. FTC, No. 14-3286 (8th Cir. Jan. 16, 2015). The FTC also argued that the 
class members would not be barred from receiving relief as a result of the FTC 
public compensation relief, noting that concerns about preclusion were an “es-
pecially weak link” in the putative class counsel’s argument. Id. at 15. 
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procedures required of class counsel. But the premise that 
seeking public compensation converts public enforcement into 
the equivalent of a private action is incorrect, as explained in 
the following Part. 
IV.  FAILURE OF THE CLASS ACTION ANALOGY   
The claim that state attorneys general violate Due Process 
by obtaining public compensation obviously fails when private 
monetary claims are not precluded by public compensation, or 
when public compensation has adequate procedural protections 
in the infrequent cases where it results in preclusion. This 
leaves the less forceful but important argument that public 
compensation would be more accountable and transparent if it 
followed class action procedures. The underlying critique and 
suggested reform rest almost entirely on the analogy between 
public compensation and class action cases. This analogy fails 
because government enforcers obtain public compensation as 
part of their discretion in bringing and shaping public enforce-
ment actions, which means accountability for public compensa-
tion should be measured by the goals and structure of exercise 
of this discretion by government enforcers rather than norms of 
class action law. 
This Part proceeds as follows: The first subpart explores 
the discretionary authority of government enforcers in seeking 
and structuring remedies. The second subpart argues that leg-
islative decisions to grant enforcers discretionary authority in 
seeking enforcement remedies means government enforcers 
tasked with public objectives are not accountable to the private 
interests of individual recipients of relief. Government enforc-
ers face a variety of pressures to resolve conflicting interests in 
enforcement actions, and the decision to seek public compensa-
tion as a remedy is no more, and may be less, subject to con-
flicts with various private interests in the enforcement action 
than the conflicts that arise from other enforcement decisions. 
The second subpart also places the class action analogy in the 
context of other largely unsuccessful arguments by enforcement 
defendants that public compensation should be treated as a 
form of government class action. The third subpart outlines 
practical reasons that class action procedures are an ill fit for 
determining the award and structure of public compensation. 
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A. ENFORCER DISCRETION IN SEEKING AND IMPLEMENTING  
REMEDIES 
Government enforcers exercise substantial discretion in 
determining when to seek public compensation and how it is 
structured. They can compromise the amount of or distribution 
scheme for public compensation in favor of other enforcement 
remedies as a matter of policy or as applied in specific case ne-
gotiations.  
1. Remedial Options in Public Enforcement 
Government enforcers seek three types of relief for viola-
tions of civil law—injunctions (or administrative orders re-
straining future conduct), civil penalties, and public compensa-
tion. They commonly seek and obtain all three types of relief in 
the same enforcement action. The distribution of remedies var-
ies by the objectives, resources, and legal constraints of the par-
ties to the action.  
Deterrence is the core goal of civil law enforcement.190 In-
junctions, or similar forms of administrative orders, are central 
to public enforcement because they are aimed at directly deter-
ring future misconduct by proscribing or requiring future con-
duct. Injunctive relief occurs in most public enforcement ac-
tions.191 Civil enforcement actions also deter through the 
assessment of civil penalties. The potential size of such penal-
ties can vary tremendously depending on the amount and cal-
culation of number of violations set forth in the authorizing 
 
 190. Velikonja, supra note 35, at 359 (“The primary purpose of the SEC’s 
enforcement activity is deterrence.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for 
Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort 
Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 952 (noting that government agencies “seek to 
deter by fines, injunctions, and orders for disgorgement and restitution”). But 
see Minzner, supra note 101, at 2129–31 (arguing that enforcement agencies 
can use retributive theories of punishment).  
 191. Hoffman, supra note 25, at 1386 (“In the usual case, at least at the 
federal level, the government will have obtained or will be seeking prospective 
relief and perhaps civil or criminal penalties.”); see also Brief for Center for 
Responsible Lending & AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 2012) (cataloging 
injunctive relief routinely obtained in state attorneys general consumer pro-
tection actions). In contrast, class action cases focus on monetary recovery. 
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and 
Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 824 (2010) (finding 89% 
of class action settlements included cash relief and 23% of cases included in-
junctive or declaratory relief).  
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statute, the severity of the violations, the willfulness of the 
conduct, and other factors.192  
Public compensation is part of but complicates the deter-
rence rationale of public enforcement. Public compensation ob-
viously provides relief to people adversely affected by the viola-
tor’s conduct.193 Courts, however, also stress the deterrence 
rationale for public compensation because it forces law viola-
tors to forego gains and takes away unfair market advantage.194 
Underscoring the deterrence rationale of public compensation 
is the fluidity between civil penalty and public compensation 
recovery in some contexts. Penalties collected in enforcement 
actions usually are paid to the general fund of the govern-
ment,195 but some enforcers are authorized to use penalty funds 
for public compensation.196 Conversely, money collected for pub-
 
 192. Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penal-
ties by Federal Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435 (1979) (de-
scribing the varying requirements of 348 federal statutes authorizing civil 
penalties); Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An 
Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 358 (2013) (describing complex 
CFPB civil penalty authority); Shelden & Gardner, supra note 57, at 388 
(state attorneys general civil penalty authority); see also Minzner, supra note 
101, at 2127–31 (describing the choices facing government enforcers in seeking 
an amount of penalties). 
 193. A similar intersection of compensatory and deterrence functions exists 
in private enforcement, but the balance weights toward compensation. Aman-
da M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Rela-
tionship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1301, 1310 (2008).  
 194. See, e.g., Eddleman v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 923 F.2d 782, 791 (10th Cir. 
1991) (“DOL’s pursuit of debarment and liquidation of back-pay claims was 
primarily to prevent unfair competition in the market by companies who pay 
substandard wages.”); State v. Master Distribs., 615 P.2d 116, 124–25 (Idaho 
1980) (“Only a substantial likelihood that defendants . . . will be subject to 
restitutionary orders will deter many with a mind to engage in sharp practic-
es.”).  
 195. Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 (2014) (“The default rule under both state and fed-
eral law is that the proceeds of public enforcement belong to the public 
fisc . . . .”). Some government enforcers are authorized to retain penalty or cost 
recoveries to fund enforcement or other agency activity. Id. at 864–76. 
 196. Winship, supra note 107, at 1118–24 (describing SEC “Fair Funds” 
authority). The CFPB has a Civil Penalty Fund which, unlike SEC Fair 
Funds, allows CFPB assessed penalties to be distributed in later cases when 
the agency is unable to collect ordered public compensation from the enforce-
ment defendant. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1075 (2012). State 
attorneys general have successfully argued that civil penalties for UDAP vio-
lations can be used to augment public compensation. CashCall, Inc. v. 
Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *19 (W. Va. May 30, 2014). 
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lic compensation often is directed to a public treasury or cy pres 
awards if it is not practical to distribute.197  
2. Discretion in Seeking Remedies 
Government enforcers exercise discretion over the balance 
of remedies to seek in enforcement actions. The highest-level 
choice is the balance between the rigor of injunctive prescrip-
tions to restrain future conduct versus some form of monetary 
payment. If a company has ceased operations, an enforcement 
action may be focused solely on obtaining a monetary recovery 
from corporate officials. When the primary goal is to change the 
conduct of a company or industry, an injunction likely will be 
the priority. In many cases, the balance between injunctive and 
monetary relief will evolve over the course of the enforcement 
action. 
Whether to seek civil penalties, public compensation or 
both as monetary relief for violations also is a discretionary 
matter, and different government enforcers have different poli-
cies as to balance of remedies.198 The U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) has a practice of eschewing public compen-
sation.199 Agency views of the relative importance of public 
compensation shift over time, and the current trend is decided-
ly in favor of more public compensation.200 The SEC, for exam-
ple, “long disclaimed any role as an instrument for private in-
dividuals to recover money,” but by 2005 had decided to seek 
the return of money to investors “whenever possible.”201 
 
 197. 15 U.S.C. § 15e(2) (2012) (stating that state antitrust enforcement re-
covery for harm to consumers can “be deemed a civil penalty by the court and 
deposited with the State as general revenues”); 17 C.F.R. § 201.1102(b) (2012) 
(allowing SEC disgorgement to be deposited into U.S. Treasury); Farmer, su-
pra note 92, at 391–400 (noting cy pres awards are common in state antitrust 
cases). 
 198. Enforcement defendants also will have varying preferences as to mon-
etary relief. For instance, they may prefer payment to consumers because it is 
tax deductible, unlike a civil penalty.  
 199. Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 536–39 (observing that the FDA obtains 
disgorgement or restitution in enforcement actions but has a practice of dis-
tributing the money to the U.S. Treasury rather than victims of the illegal 
conduct). 
 200. Id. at 529 (stating “SEC-based compensation has increased dramati-
cally” after 2002); id. at 534 (stating “FTC-based compensation to victims has 
increased tremendously” since the 1970s). 
 201. Winship, supra note 107, at 1110. The FTC view of public compensa-
tion in antitrust enforcement similarly has evolved. See supra note 66 and ac-
companying text. 
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In a series of enforcement actions against mortgage servic-
ing companies, state attorneys general used their authority to 
seek penalties to obtain a multi-billion dollar public compensa-
tion program for loan modifications.202 
Regardless of the general disposition of the government en-
forcer toward public compensation, the mix of remedies ob-
tained in an enforcement action remains a case-by-case deci-
sion in public enforcement. Banking regulators, for instance, 
have settled cases involving illegal practices in account over-
draft charges by imposing only a civil penalty,203 by administra-
tive order concerning regulatory compliance,204 or by an order 
with all forms of relief—civil penalty, public compensation, and 
an order requiring operational changes.205  
3. Discretion in Structuring Public Compensation 
The broad discretion of government enforcers usually ex-
tends to distribution mechanisms and procedures for public 
compensation. In most circumstances, no regulatory scheme 
requires specific procedures for public compensation, and thus 
the procedures are shaped by the court or agency, or more typi-
cally through settlement on a case-by-case basis.  
Unlike class actions, notice to consumers typically occurs 
after the plan for public compensation is determined. Consum-
ers do not have a right to object to the terms of the distribution. 
A key difference in public compensation procedures is 
whether the compensation requires the consumer to file a 
claim, and if so, the type of claims process. Some public com-
pensation cases involve a distribution of the relief without any 
requirement for consumer involvement. The recipients and 
amount of public compensation per person is determined based 
on the business records of the enforcement defendant. The gov-
ernment enforcer either requires the defendant to provide the 
compensation,206 or the enforcement defendant is given credit 
 
 202. Totten, supra note 20, at 1639–47. 
 203. In re Greenbank Greeneville, FDIC-10-802K (Sept. 2, 2011) (order to 
pay), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/2011-09-40.pdf. 
 204. Appeal of Violation of Federal Trade Commission Act and Material 
Supervisory Determinations (First Quarter 2012), OCC, http://www.occ.treas 
.gov/topics/dispute-resolution/bank-appeals/summaries/appeal-violations-trade 
-q1-2012.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2016). 
 205. Press Release, OCC, OCC, Woodforest National Bank Enter Agree-
ment To Reimburse Consumers (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.occ.gov/news 
-issuances/news-releases/2010/nr-occ-2010-122.html. 
 206. See, e.g., Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Orders American Express To 
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for refunds or actions to recompense consumers based on crite-
ria identified in a settlement agreement,207 or the government 
enforcer receives a fixed amount for public compensation and 
has broad discretion to distribute the money.208 Public compen-
sation occasionally requires no distribution because it is relief 
that benefits individuals but does not require the payment of 
money, such as when a defendant foregoes the right to collect 
an alleged debt.209  
Claim forms are used in cases where the customer must 
opt-in to receive the offered relief. Some claims require only 
that the consumer file a form to receive the offered relief, while 
other claim forms require the consumer to certify that she 
meets an eligibility requirement, or to submit proof of eligibility 
for the relief.210 An important distinction in claims procedure in 
 
Pay $59.5 Million for Illegal Credit Card Practices (Dec. 23, 2013), http:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders-american-express-to-pay-59 
-5-million-for-illegal-credit-card-practices (announcing settlement of joint en-
forcement action with OCC and FDIC and describing refund procedure as fol-
lows: “If the consumers are still American Express customers, they will receive 
a credit to their accounts. If they are no longer an American Express credit 
card holder, they will receive checks in the mail. Consumers are not required 
to take any action to receive their credit or check.”); see also Velikonja, supra 
note 35, at 392 (“Where the defendant is solvent and trustworthy and the vic-
tims identifiable without a notice and claims process, the SEC has ordered the 
defendant . . . to compensate its victims directly—eliminating the need to cre-
ate a distribution fund.”). 
 207. See, e.g., National Mortgage Settlement Summary, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services 
-and-commerce/national-mortgage-settlement-summary.aspx (describing $17 
billion of relief for certain types of actions, such as mortgage modifications, for 
which the mortgage servicer “will receive credit for completing these consumer 
relief activities”). 
 208. See, e.g., Final Order, FTC v. Info. Mgmt. Forum, Civ No. 6:12-cv-986-
Orl-31 KRS, at 8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2013) (indicating that over $16.9 million 
was to be dispersed under FTC’s direction); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Trimble, No. 11-CV-PAB-KMT, 2013 WL 317576, at *10–11 (D. 
Colo. Jan. 28, 2013) (awarding more than $878,000 in restitution to investors 
to be distributed at discretion of court-appointed monitor). 
 209. The CFPB, for example, obtained a settlement with the Zenith Educa-
tion Group in February 2015 to reduce student loan principal balances by 40% 
for Corinthian College graduates. Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Secures $480 
Million in Debt Relief for Current and Former Corinthian Students (Feb. 3, 
2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-secures-480-million-in 
-debt-relief-for-current-and-former-corinthian-students. 
 210. Compare Consent Order, In re Ace Cash Express, Inc., 2014-CFPB-
0008, at 17–18 (July 8, 2014) (appointing a third-party administrator to create 
and distribute claims forms for public compensation to payday loan borrowers 
with no proof requirements), with Consumer Prot. Div. Office of Atty. Gen. v. 
Consumer Pub. Co., 501 A.2d 48, 74 (Md. 1985) (requiring consumers to file a 
claim form stating “that they relied on the false impressions created by the 
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public compensation arises with regard to whether acceptance 
of the relief is made contingent on the consumer executing a re-
lease of private claims against the enforcement defendant, 
which occurs in some cases.211 
Unlike class actions, judicial review is not always required 
in public compensation cases. Settlements in administrative ac-
tions generally are not subject to judicial review, but courts 
sometimes review enforcement actions filed in a judicial forum, 
even if a settlement is reached.212 State attorneys general fre-
quently settle cases prior to filing a lawsuit through use of an 
assurance of voluntary compliance, which is a statutory author-
ization for such settlements and can require judicial approv-
al.213 
B. BROAD REMEDIAL DISCRETION UNDER STATUTORY  
AUTHORITY DISTINGUISHES PUBLIC COMPENSATION FROM CLASS  
ACTION REMEDIES 
Public and private enforcement of civil law overlap in pur-
pose and consequence. Both types of enforcement deter, and 
both compensate people who suffer loss. That public and pri-
vate enforcement share attributes, however, should not obscure 
fundamental differences. Government enforcers have a differ-
ent job than class action attorneys, and accountability has a 
different meaning for public compensation than it does for 
monetary recovery in private actions. 
1. Differing Origins of Public Enforcement Authority and  
Class Action Certification 
Public enforcement rests on legislative designation of gov-
ernment entities to exercise broad discretion in enforcing spe-
cific statutory schemes. These statutory schemes do not charge 
government enforcers with obligations to represent private in-
terests.214 This point becomes apparent in civil public enforce-
 
advertising” at issue). 
 211. See infra Part V.B. 
 212. Winship, supra note 131, at 559 (“Courts have often evaluated wheth-
er SEC settlements and distributions are fair, reasonable, and adequate.”). 
 213. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 407.030 (2015) (requiring assurance subject 
to get approval of the court). State attorneys general also commonly jointly file 
a complaint and proposed consent judgment, which requires court review and 
approval. See, e.g., Consent Judgment, Washington v. Household Int’l, Inc., 
No. 02-2-35630-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2002) (including the complaint of 
the Washington Attorney General). 
 214. Again, state antitrust enforcement actions, under the Clayton Act, are 
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ment litigation when the government calls consumers, inves-
tors, or employees as witnesses who can testify about the al-
leged illegal conduct, or the enforcement defendant deposes 
these individuals. The government enforcer does not represent 
these individuals in the same way as would the individuals’ 
private counsel, so the defendant is free to obtain testimony 
about conversations these individuals have with government 
attorneys or investigators, as no attorney-client privilege ap-
plies. The fact that government enforcers do not represent the 
recipients of public compensation renders unnecessary an in-
quiry into the adequacy of the purported representation as a 
constitutional matter.215 
Government enforcers have authority to define enforce-
ment priorities when implementing statutory schemes. Flexi-
bility in selecting and implementing enforcement remedies is 
part of the broad discretion invested by Congress and state leg-
islatures in government enforcers. Part of this discretionary 
authority involves considering whether to seek public compen-
sation or not, structure it in one way or another, and balancing 
it against other remedies. Statutes authorizing public compen-
sation do not provide for private rights in the pursuit of that 
compensation. 
In contrast, the class action is a procedural mechanism 
that rests on the grievances and claims of the class members. 
Class members do not pick the representative of their private 
interests in class actions. Accordingly, class actions are certi-
fied under civil procedure aggregation rules that invest author-
ity in class counsel and class representatives only if they ade-
quately represent the interests of the class. Notice, opt-out and 
judicial review requirements for class actions flow, in part, 
from the need for some formal method of apprising class coun-
sel fealty to this principle.  
The underlying rationale for public compensation authority 
granted in public enforcement, therefore, wholly differs from 
the rationale for granting class counsel and class representa-
tives the authority to prosecute a class action. The less rigorous 
procedures for public compensation compared to a class action 
 
exceptions because the state is expressly authorized to represent private in-
terests of its citizens and required to comply with procedures designed to af-
ford Due Process protections of those private interests. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 215. Courts and government enforcers can and do structure public compen-
sation so as to require the recipient to release claims as a condition of obtain-
ing the compensation, which raises issues of adequacy of representation as a 
practical matter. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B. 
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make sense because public compensation is pursued or foregone 
by decision of the government enforcer. A state attorney gen-
eral, for example, can decide to settle an enforcement action 
with a $50 million penalty and an injunction, even if the gov-
ernment’s complaint sought public compensation as a remedy 
and prior settlement discussions included a demand by the 
state attorney general for $25 million each in penalties and 
public compensation. Counsel and class representatives for a 
class action certified based on alleged monetary damages suf-
fered by the class cannot operate similarly in unilaterally de-
ciding to forego any monetary relief for the class in favor of a 
payment to the government or reform of sales practices, absent 
unusual circumstances.  
Contrast this broad discretion to seek and shape relief, 
with the criticism that public compensation occurs without ef-
fective participation or control by the recipients, against the 
stricter requirements for notice and objection rights provided in 
class action cases. These notice and objection rights exist be-
cause class actions assert the collective claims of class members 
and the class case results in preclusion of those claims. Gov-
ernment enforcers who decide to seek public compensation have 
no obligations to obtain a certain amount of compensation, 
structure the compensation in a particular manner, or involve 
the recipients of relief in any way. Some enforcement actions 
resulting in public compensation involve close collaboration be-
tween the government enforcer and recipients of relief or advo-
cates for those recipients. Recipients in other public compensa-
tion cases discover the existence of the enforcement action 
when they receive an account credit or a claim form or through 
discovering media stories. From the perspective of legislatively 
granted authority, there is no difference in the legitimacy of 
public compensation in these two situations. 
2. Public Compensation Is Part of the Broader Exercise of  
Discretion in Civil Law Enforcement  
The scholarly critics mostly ignore this difference in the 
origin of the authority for public enforcement versus private 
aggregate actions. Instead, they offer a functional critique. 
They contend that choosing to seek monetary relief for a group 
of people effectively puts government enforcers in the same po-
sition as class counsel, and thus government enforcers have the 
same problems of accountability to and consent from the recipi-
ents of relief. So “like class counsel,” they are prone to accept 
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inadequate, “quick and easy” settlements, among other prob-
lems.216  
This argument narrows the scope of the inquiry without 
justification. There is no difference between the issues of ac-
countability and consent in public compensation and the same 
concerns with other enforcement decisions made by govern-
ment enforcers. The critics appear to be picking a fight with the 
use of one government enforcement remedy, but their position 
really attacks a legislative choice to grant broad discretion to 
government enforcers. 
Take the argument of the critics that packs the most 
force—that government enforcers have conflicts of interests 
with the potential recipients of public compensation. For sure, 
government enforcers have multiple interests to consider in 
any enforcement action, and some of these interests will some-
times conflict with some or all compensation recipients. This 
observation, however, applies to the full range of enforcement 
discretion entrusted to the government enforcer, not just public 
compensation. The key for our inquiry is to sort out the conflict 
of interest concerns unique to public compensation that would 
justify imposing new procedural requirements only on this as-
pect of public enforcement.  
Government enforcers decide which problems within their 
purview deserve attention, which cases in those areas to inves-
tigate as an enforcement concern, and which cases investigated 
will be pursued as an enforcement action. Once a specific case 
achieves regulatory attention worthy of enforcement, the gov-
ernment enforcer faces a new set of decisions, which usually in-
cludes the scope of conduct to investigate, the investigative 
methods, the best forum for the action, what violations of law to 
allege, and whom to target (e.g., whether to include corporate 
officials as defendants). Then comes the issue of what relief to 
seek as to which targets of the action, with the familiar alloca-
tion between injunctive relief, penalties, and restitution. 
The critique of public compensation starts after all these 
decisions have been made, when the government enforcer has 
begun to prosecute an enforcement action and determined to 
seek consumer, investor, or employee relief as one remedy. The 
focus of the critique is on how much compensation was obtained 
in the action and to whom it was distributed. These questions 
 
 216. Lemos, supra note 7, at 491; see Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 551 (in-
dicating that “agencies may seek quick settlements to resolve embarrassing 
missteps in regulatory policy”). 
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do not raise any patent concerns about conflicts of interest and 
accountability that are absent from the other welter of deci-
sions in the enforcement action. If an individual, advocacy or-
ganization, or company lobbies a government enforcer to initi-
ate, or refrain from initiating, an enforcement action against a 
particular company or against an industry, one can point to the 
conflicting interests of the government enforcer as motivating 
its decision, to bring an action or demure.217 The same critique 
about conflicting interests can be leveled if a government en-
forcer decides to sue Company X and not its competitors, or 
seeks only injunctive relief and not monetary relief. 
Consider examples from the list of specific conflicts of in-
terest that animate the critics. If a regulator becomes captive of 
the interests of the regulated entities, the decision to bring an 
action or not, or the strength of injunctive relief constraining 
future conduct, or total monetary value of the case including 
penalties would seem to be more affected by this conflict than 
how public compensation is distributed. In the wake of the mul-
ti-billion dollar settlement between the DOJ and J.P. Morgan 
Chase involving the sale of mortgage securities, a public inter-
est group sued the DOJ for failure to seek judicial review and 
reveal information about the settlement, but the focus of the 
suit was on the overall relief and penalties assessed rather 
than the public compensation.218 The same is true of a state at-
torney general suing for UDAP violations but mostly concerned 
about the loss of jobs of an in-state defendant employer result-
ing from the enforcement action. The attorney general could 
forgo the lawsuit, compromise on the details of injunctive relief, 
or abstain from seeking penalties just as easily as she could fail 
 
 217. For instance, a “short seller” investor anticipating a drop in the stock 
price of Herbalife recently lobbied the FTC and state attorneys general to 
bring a UDAP action against the company. Michael Schmidt et al., After Big 
Bet, Hedge Fund Pulls the Levers of Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/business/staking-1-billion-that-herbalife 
-will-fail-then-ackman-lobbying-to-bring-it-down.html. 
 218. Ben Protess, Lawsuit Challenges Government’s $13 Billion Deal with 
JPMorgan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/ 
10/justice-department-sued-over-13-billion-jpmorgan-pact; see also Lisa Gil-
bert & Brett Naylor, Bank Settlements Need To Reveal More Information, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/27/ 
holding-bankers-accountable/bank-settlements-need-to-reveal-more 
-information (arguing that the settlement did not reveal the underlying allega-
tions and thus it was not possible to determine if the DOJ should have pur-
sued criminal prosecutions). 
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to aggressively pursue public compensation or structure com-
pensation in a certain form. 
Public compensation arguably raises fewer issues of public 
accountability than other discretionary enforcement decisions, 
even those choices limited only to remedies. An individual or 
class can seek relief from inadequate public compensation 
where such suits are feasible.219 No alternate private relief is 
available for the person disappointed in the injunctive relief 
from the enforcement action or the amount of civil penalty paid 
to the government.220 We have seen that homeowners can seek 
damages for harm caused by a polluter, for example, but they 
have no recourse to challenge a remediation plan resulting 
from a public enforcement action.221 The fact that decisions of 
the government enforcer are subject to comparison with later 
private actions may give pause to elected or appointed officials 
who want to settle cheaply or distribute the money in service of 
unsavory motives. The same is true when courts review the ad-
equacy of public compensation in determining whether to certi-
fy a class action. These situations present the possibility that 
the government enforcer’s decision on public compensation will 
be publicly scrutinized and publicly criticized in the subsequent 
private case, a result not likely as to injunctive relief because a 
private action challenging the injunction would be precluded.  
In short, arguments for procedural reform of public com-
pensation, based on a litany of perceived conflicts of interest or 
problems of “client monitoring and control,”222 are arguments 
against the unavoidable and routine exercise of discretion in 
government civil law enforcement. One could protest the 
breadth of discretion afforded to public officials in civil law en-
forcement, as have advocates for corporate enforcement de-
fendants.223 But urging class action procedures only as to public 
compensation misconstrues the purpose and operation of public 
enforcement. 
 
 219. See supra Part III.A. 
 220. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 221. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 222. Lemos, supra note 7, at 518–22.  
 223. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM, UNPRINCIPLED PROSECU-
TION: ABUSE OF POWER AND PROFITEERING IN THE NEW “LITIGATION SWARM” 3 
(2014) (“Exercises of significant government authority should be subject to 
checks and balances. Yet enforcement officials have virtually unrestricted dis-
cretion in deciding whether to initiate investigations and institute lawsuits, 
and in setting the price of settlement.”). 
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3. Judicial Recognition of the Importance of Enforcement  
Discretion in Rejecting the Class Action Analogy 
The differences in authority and function of public and pri-
vate enforcement explain case law that overwhelmingly rejects 
application of the class action analogy to public compensation 
in a variety of contexts. Enforcement defendants repeatedly 
have attempted to define public compensation as a public form 
of a private class action suit to force limits on its use as a rem-
edy. In largely rejecting these arguments, courts articulate the 
importance of government enforcer discretion in shaping public 
enforcement under authority in statutory schemes. The deci-
sions—of the U.S. Supreme Court in General Telephone and the 
California Supreme Court in Pacific Land Research—that gov-
ernment enforcers need not use preclusive class action proce-
dures when seeking public compensation are such cases,224 and 
the rejection of the class action analogy has occurred in other 
contexts. 
The Lemos article was cited repeatedly in the briefs of 
business defendants and industry amici, including in Missis-
sippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., a 2014 U.S. Supreme 
Court case holding that a state enforcement action is not con-
verted into a “mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA) when the state seeks public compensation as a reme-
dy.225 Enforcement defendants had argued in a series of circuit 
cases that state enforcement action became a “disguised class 
action” when the state sought public compensation, thus mak-
 
 224. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 225. 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014). The Lemos article was also cited in the following 
briefs: Brief for Respondents at 58 n.6, Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-
1036), 2013 WL 4769415; Brief for Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers 
of America & American Bankers Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 7 n.3, Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 
4875113; Brief of DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 10–11, Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 
WL 4829338; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27–33, AU Optronics 
Corp. v. South Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014) (No. 12-911), 2013 WL 287738 
(citing Lemos multiple times). The Lemos article was cited in numerous indus-
try amici briefs in support of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in State v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266 (N.H. 2015), including for the proposition 
that the prevailing view of courts is that public compensation results in pre-
clusion of later private claims. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America & Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of 
America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Exxon, 126 A.3d 266 
(No. 15-933), 2016 WL 704923; Brief International Association of Defense 
Counsel as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Exxon, 126 A.3d 266 
(No. 15-933), 2016 WL 738178. 
  
2362 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2313 
 
ing state enforcement actions removable under CAFA.226 Three 
of four circuits rejected this argument prior to the Supreme 
Court similarly resolving the issue. The Ninth Circuit held that 
“Nevada’s sovereign interest in protecting its citizens and econ-
omy from deceptive mortgage practices is not diminished mere-
ly because it has tacked on a claim for restitution.”227 Prior to 
the enactment of CAFA, enforcement defendants removed cases 
by state attorneys general seeking public compensation to fed-
eral court by asserting that the potential recipients of relief 
were the real parties in interest and thus diversity jurisdiction 
authorized removal. Courts remanded these actions to state 
court because public compensation was one remedy sought in 
an enforcement case with a broader public purpose.228 
 
 226. LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating 
that defendants characterized state attorney general suits as a “disguised 
class action”). CAFA allows for removal to federal court of “mass actions,” 
which CAFA defines as “monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons . . . 
proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve 
common questions of law or fact.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012). Four 
federal circuits—the Second, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth—rejected the argu-
ment that public compensation cases were mass actions removable to federal 
court under CAFA based on a review of the whole complaint. Purdue Pharma 
L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 2013); AU Optronics v. South 
Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014); 
Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 2012); LG Display, 
665 F.3d at 773–74. The Fifth Circuit held that a state public enforcement ac-
tion could be reviewed for each specific claim and type of relief for CAFA pur-
poses, and an action seeking public compensation was removable under CAFA. 
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2012), 
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014). The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit without di-
rectly engaging the circuit split regarding the “whole complaint” versus “claim 
specific” approach. See Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. at 746; Georgene Vairo, Is the 
Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class Members?, 64 EMORY 
L.J. 477, 521–29 (2014) (describing the CAFA litigation in state attorney gen-
eral cases). 
 227. Nevada, 672 F.3d at 671. 
 228. New York v. Gen. Motors Corp., 547 F. Supp. 703, 706–07 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (“This conclusion is not altered by the State’s decision to seek 
restitutionary relief and damages on behalf of those who allegedly have been 
defrauded by GM. Recovery of damages for aggrieved consumers is but one as-
pect of the case.”); accord Missouri ex rel. Webster v. Best Buy Co., 715 F. 
Supp. 1455, 1457 (E.D. Mo. 1989); Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hunt Int’l Res. Corp., 
481 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (rejecting defendant’s argument that “the 
‘private’ relief of restitution and damages on behalf of a class of land purchas-
ers is separate and independent from the claim for ‘public’ relief in the form of 
an injunction and civil penalties sought by the Attorney General”); see also 
People ex rel. Hartigan v. Lann, 587 N.E.2d 521, 523–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(rejecting the argument that the Illinois Attorney General must represent in-
dividual consumers for purposes of discovery requests because consumers 
were real parties in interest). 
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New York state courts rejected an argument by former AIG 
officials that federal securities law governing private class ac-
tion suits applies to state enforcement action because the New 
York Attorney General was acting as “a de facto representa-
tive” of stockholders in bringing an enforcement action seeking 
public compensation.229 The court emphasized the distinction 
between public and private actions in describing why the At-
torney General was not representing the stockholders:  
[A]fter years of joint federal and state investigation, the Attorney 
General exercised the discretion of his office to bring this enforcement 
action . . . to protect the citizens of this State and the integrity of the 
securities marketplace in New York, to enjoin allegedly fraudulent 
practices, and to direct restitution and damages to deter future simi-
lar misconduct.230 
For similar reasons, federal courts have held that public 
compensation in state UDAP enforcement cases is to “effectu-
ate public policy” rather than “adjudicate private rights,” and 
thus seeking public compensation falls within the police and 
regulatory exceptions in bankruptcy.231 In finding that public 
compensation is “fundamentally law enforcement,” the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the character of an enforcement action 
“is not affected by the choice of restitution as a remedy.”232 
 
 229. People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, 946 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (App. Div. 2012). 
A parallel class later settled and the Attorney General agreed on appeal to the 
highest state court that public compensation in the form of damages was not 
possible in the face of the class settlement and in light of prior New York prec-
edent. People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, 994 N.E.2d 838, 840–41 (N.Y. 2013). 
 230. Cuomo, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 6. The Washington Supreme Court also up-
held the constitutionality of the express statutory authority of its Attorney 
General for public compensation over an objection that “obtaining money or 
property restoration by the Attorney General for private parties who were 
complaining witnesses would be in effect having the Attorney General directly 
representing those persons.” State v. Ralph Williams’ N.W. Chrysler Plym-
outh, Inc., 510 P.2d 233, 241 (Wash. 1973). 
 231. City of San Francisco v. PG & E Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 
2006) (holding that there was no right of removal because the police and regu-
latory exemption applies to a claim by California state and local authorities for 
restitution from a bankrupt utility); In re First All. Mortg. Co., 263 B.R. 99, 
109–15 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (finding an automatic stay to be inapplicable to 
a claim by Massachusetts Attorney General seeking restitution for subprime 
mortgage borrowers); In re Luskin’s, Inc., 213 B.R. 107, 108 (D. Md. 1997) 
(finding an automatic stay inapplicable to a claim by Maryland Attorney Gen-
eral seeking restitution for deceptive advertising by a retailer). In In re First 
Alliance Mortgage Co., the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dis-
cussed an earlier, contrary decision and found that it was not supportable 
based on later case law development. 263 B.R. at 111–12. This Panel also not-
ed cases reaching a contrary result when restitution was victim-specific rather 
than public compensation. Id. at 112–13. 
 232. City of San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 1126. 
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Some government enforcers, notably the EEOC, regularly 
obtain victim-specific relief rather than public compensation for 
a numerous group. In victim-specific suits, the EEOC seeks re-
lief for one employee or a small number of identified individu-
als.233 These suits draw government enforcers as close as possi-
ble to representing private interests. Yet even in this situation, 
courts usually draw the line between public enforcement and 
private interests.  
The U.S. Supreme Court rendered such a decision when 
the EEOC sued Waffle House, Inc. for violations of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act as to a single employee.234 The Court 
rejected an attempt by Waffle House to compel the EEOC to 
arbitrate its claim under the conditions of a pre-dispute arbi-
tration clause in the contract between the employee and the 
company.235 The Court articulated the importance of under-
standing the requested EEOC relief as part of its exercise of 
discretion under a public enforcement scheme: 
[W]henever the EEOC chooses from among the many charges filed 
each year to bring an enforcement action in a particular case, the 
agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply pro-
vide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entire-
ly victim-specific relief. To hold otherwise would undermine the de-
tailed enforcement scheme created by Congress simply to give greater 
effect to an agreement between private parties that does not even 
contemplate the EEOC’s statutory function.236 
State courts have similarly refused to enforce arbitration 
clauses in enforcement actions brought by state attorneys gen-
eral and state regulators for the same reasons.237 These deci-
 
 233. Morrison, supra note 38, at 121 (indicating the EEOC may bring a 
pattern and practice case, or it “may also bring suit based on an aggrieved in-
dividual or individuals’ charge of discrimination”). Victim-specific compensa-
tion occurs in a variety of other types of enforcement actions, including enforc-
ers that typically obtain public compensation. See, e.g., State ex rel. Celebrezze 
v. Eastside Nissan, Inc., No. 87CV-10-6460, 1987 WL 421777, at *3 (Ohio Ct. 
Com. Pl. Oct. 13, 1987) (detailing the UDAP enforcement action by Ohio At-
torney General resulting in payments to three identified car buyers). Other 
enforcers are smaller regulatory entities like occupational licensing entities. 
See Bitter v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 02-12-00197-CV, 2014 WL 
1999315 (Tex. App. May 15, 2014) (providing restitution to specific victims of 
attorney misconduct). 
 234. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
 235. Id. at 293–95. 
 236. Id. at 296. 
 237. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 843 N.W.2d 727, 740–
41 (Iowa 2014) (refusing to compel arbitration in civil rights employment en-
forcement action and noting similar state appellate court holdings in New 
York and Massachusetts); State ex rel. Hatch v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 703 
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sions flip on its head the assertion by critics that public com-
pensation is essentially a government form of class action. Ra-
ther, statutory schemes permitting government enforcers to 
seek public compensation at their discretion without requiring 
use of class action procedures reflect a legislative decision that 
public compensation should not be governed by norms underly-
ing class action suits. Analogizing or equating class action 
monetary recovery and public compensation creates misunder-
standing as to the reasons that courts, legislators, and govern-
ment enforcers act as they have in structuring public compen-
sation in civil law enforcement.  
C. CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES ARE AN ILL FIT FOR PUBLIC  
COMPENSATION IN VARYING ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTS 
The argument to this point has been that the use of flexi-
ble, less onerous procedures for public compensation neither 
raises constitutional concerns nor results in problems of ac-
countability and consent that have any meaning in the context 
of public enforcement. But what about applying class action 
procedures for practical policy reasons? Perhaps rigorous pro-
cedural requirements for public compensation would make it 
fairer and more responsive to the needs of recipients. But any 
theoretical appeal of this idea quickly dissolves when consider-
ing the ill fit and negative consequences of imposing more on-
erous procedures on public compensation as it occurs under 
varying statutory schemes and in varying enforcement envi-
ronments. One can imagine a case for imposing class action 
procedures in a specifically identified enforcement context. A 
broad-brush comparison of class actions and public compensa-
tion, however, does little to identify when such procedures are 
warranted, if ever. Although not an exhaustive list, this sub-
part looks at the following four variations in public compensa-
tion that undermine a call for broad imposition of costly proce-
dures: differing proof requirements, differing importance of 
 
N.W.2d 562, 574–75 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (refusing to compel arbitration in a 
case brought by state attorney general under common law parens and statuto-
ry injunctive authority for tort violations in debt collection); People ex rel. 
Cuomo v. Coventry First LLC, 915 N.E.2d 616, 619 (N.Y. 2009) (indicating 
that arbitration agreements between insurance entities did not require New 
York Attorney General to arbitrate claims against insurer); Taylor v. Ernst & 
Young LLP, 958 N.E.2d 1203, 1211 (Ohio 2011) (refusing to compel arbitration 
by the state superintendent of insurance in his “public-protection role”). But 
see Ropp v. 1717 Capital Mgmt. Co., No. CIV.A. 02-1701-KAJ, 2004 WL 93945, 
at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2004) (stating that an arbitration clause is enforceable 
when state securities commissioner seeks victim-specific relief). 
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non-monetary factors in compensation, the fact that many pub-
lic compensation schemes make recipients whole, and the ad-
verse impact on recipients of public compensation that will fol-
low added procedural costs. 
First, unlike private class actions, calculation of public 
compensation often is not based on the loss of the consumer, 
investor, or employee, so there is less or no reason to impose 
procedures designed to ensure the consent of the recipient. 
Government enforcers usually seek restitution or disgorgement 
or another form of equitable relief. Private actions typically 
seek damages. The proof required, the measure of loss or recov-
ery, and the definition of success can differ in public compensa-
tion and private actions. Many enforcement actions, including 
most FTC, SEC, and CFTC cases, are based on a restitution or 
disgorgement theory that measures public compensation by the 
illegal gain to the defendant rather than an estimate of loss to 
the consumer or investor.238 And the amount of public compen-
sation can be derived in an imprecise manner fitting a deter-
rence rationale, but not appropriate for proof in a damages 
case.239 
In some cases, the source of funds for public compensation 
is wholly removed from the distribution of funds. The CFPB au-
thorizing statute establishes a Civil Penalty Fund that allows 
the agency to use money obtained in a prior enforcement action 
to fund public compensation in a later enforcement action.240 
Other government enforcers have authority to deploy civil pen-
alty recoveries for public compensation, even though such pen-
alties are derived from different considerations than consumer 
loss.241 These sorts of public compensation recoveries are alien 
to a private action for damages or other monetary relief, and 
thus the justification for imposing private class action proce-
dures has no application in such actions. 
 
 238. FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 67 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining 
that in FTC cases, “appropriate measure for restitution is the benefit unjustly 
received by the defendants”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. 
Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 78 (3d Cir. 1993) (following an approach re-
garding compensation similar to the CFTC cases). The Pennsylvania State Se-
curities Regulator’s authority to obtain restitution and disgorgement is a 
sharp example of this distinction. However, it can seek damages only when 
“enforcement of the rights of such persons by private civil action, whether by 
class action or otherwise, would be so burdensome or expensive as to be im-
practical.” 70 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-509 (West 2014). 
 239. See supra note 64. 
 240. See supra note 196. 
 241. See, e.g., supra note 196. 
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Second, government enforcers have discretion to consider 
numerous factors other than the amount or distribution scheme 
for recovery. For example, timeliness of relief can be one of the 
primary factors in shaping public compensation. The state at-
torney general enforcement actions during the foreclosure crisis 
occurred in a situation where the quantity of relief to distressed 
borrowers needed to be balanced against the need for relief 
while homeowners were still in possession of their homes. Class 
action procedures would attenuate the process and prevent 
swifter public enforcement remedies when necessary. 
Third, a substantial amount of public compensation fully 
compensates the recipients of the relief. Even though securities 
regulators have been heavily criticized for inadequate distribu-
tions, the study of SEC actions by Urska Velikonja identified 
over fifty cases, almost twenty-five percent of the total cases 
evaluated, in which SEC public compensation made claimants 
whole or appeared to do so, or provided “very close” to full com-
pensation of loss.242 Empirical study is needed in other areas to 
determine exactly what percentage of public compensation 
achieves full compensation, but anecdotal evidence is easy to 
find in almost all relevant regulatory areas. The seminal Porter 
case involved full compensation for the tenants who overpaid 
rent, and many of the consumer cases previously described ful-
ly returned the amount expended by all consumers who were 
charged for a good or service.243 Wholly compensating an entire 
group alleviates any concerns about the adequacy or fairness of 
the distribution. 
Fourth, public compensation is less costly in its current 
form. Class action notice, objection, and review procedures 
would add expense and impose case supervision burdens. These 
costs could be substantial relative to the amount of recovery in 
small-dollar actions, which occur in many consumer finance 
cases. Whether in response to these costs or to the administra-
tive burdens of implementing procedures, government enforc-
 
 242. Velikonja, supra note 35, at 363–64. 
 243. See, e.g., CFPB, supra note 6 (reporting that credit card add-on cases 
by CFPB returned full cost of product); see also In re Lorazepam & 
Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 402–03 (D.D.C. 2002) (providing 
full relief to more than 244,000 buyers of medication); State ex rel. Humphrey 
v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (uphold-
ing award of full cost of air purifying units as restitution); State ex rel. 
McGraw v. Imperial Mktg., 506 S.E.2d 799, 811 (W. Va. 1998) (granting full 
refund without requiring return of product with “ambiguous” value); infra 
note 247 (listing cases with full relief).  
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ers have the discretion to simply forego public compensation in 
favor of civil penalties, and likely would make this substitution 
in many small-dollar cases. Any substitution of penalties for 
public compensation will be at the expense of private interests 
in compensation when a class action is not feasible and the 
small-dollar loss makes individual cases impractical.244 
Public enforcement actions operate on different premises 
and with different legal authority than class actions. Not sur-
prisingly, importing class procedures into a public enforcement 
context would needlessly impose costs and discourage govern-
ment enforcer use of a valuable tool. 
V.  WHEN PUBLIC COMPENSATION CONFLICTS WITH 
PRIVATE RIGHTS   
The analogy between public compensation and class ac-
tions neither explains how legislatures and courts have struc-
tured public compensation, nor illuminates consequential con-
flicts between private rights and public compensation, nor 
supports the recommendation that class procedures should ap-
ply when enforcers seek public compensation. This Part turns 
the problem around by identifying categories of cases where 
public compensation conflicts with later assertion of private 
rights and asks whether these conflicts have adverse real-world 
impacts on the assertion of private rights. Finding some of the-
se conflicts to be of consequence and avoidable, this Part sug-
gests targeted law reform proposals to restore a proper balance 
with public enforcement objectives when appropriate.  
Government enforcers and courts limit private rights fol-
lowing public compensation, legally or as a practical matter, in 
two circumstances.245 We have already seen the first set of cas-
 
 244. A complete analysis of the costs and disadvantages of class action pro-
cedures for public enforcement is not possible here, but it is doubtful whether 
such procedures would be appropriate and effective in public compensation 
even if there were reasons for constraining the current practice of public com-
pensation. As Deborah Hensler suggests in reviewing the proposal by Lemos 
for stricter judicial review of public compensation, “[t]he theoretically attrac-
tive procedural solution, authorizing judges to conduct a case-by-case inquiry 
into an elected official’s ability to represent faithfully the interest of class 
members is fraught with dangers, both practical and political.” Deborah R. 
Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 59 (2012).  
 245. This Part does not address situations where private rights are limited 
by legislative choice to make public enforcement the exclusive or preemptive 
means of enforcement. Some statutory rights are restricted to public enforce-
ment. For example, state UDAP laws almost universally contain a private 
right of action, CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 55, § 12.2.1, but federal UDAP 
  
2016] PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT COMPENSATION 2369 
 
es—where courts refuse to certify a class action because a class 
would not be a superior adjudicative mechanism in light of the 
public compensation. The second category of cases is public en-
forcement settlements predicated on a release of claims by the 
recipient of public compensation.  
A. JUDICIAL DENIAL OF CLASS CERTIFICATION 
The existence of a government enforcement action can re-
sult in a court refusing to certify a class action as a “superior” 
method of adjudication due to public compensation, although 
such cases are not frequent.246 In theory and operation, judicial 
denials of class certification based on a completed government 
enforcement action do not typically present a conflict between 
 
laws enforced by the FTC and the CFPB provide exclusively for public en-
forcement. SHELDON ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.8 (stating there is no private 
right of action under CFPB UDAAP authority); Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball 
Disguised as Law Reform: ALEC’s Model Act on Private Enforcement of Con-
sumer Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279, 282 (2015) 
(“The FTC Act itself has never featured a private right of action.”). Other stat-
utes authorize public enforcement of the entire statutory scheme and provide 
only for private enforcement of specified types of violations. See, e.g., 7 FEDER-
AL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 15:67 (Mar. 2016) (identifying which re-
quirements of Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act have a private right 
of action). A few statutory schemes include both public and private enforce-
ment rights, but provide that private enforcement cannot occur when the gov-
ernment enforcer acts. An EEOC action under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA) “terminate(s)” an individual’s private right of action. 29 
U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(1) (2012). See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies 
as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013) (discussing various forms 
of public oversight or displacement of private rights of action). Nor does this 
Part examine situations in which practical conflicts occur between parallel 
public and private actions, such as when a defunct defendant has limited re-
sources to allocate between the two actions, which is a problem of appropriate 
use of discretion by the government enforcer to efficiently coordinate parallel 
actions.  
 246. Steven Malech & Seth Huttner, What Is Superiority? The Role of 
Completed, Pending, and Anticipated Government Activity in Certifying a 
Class Action, 9 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (2010) (noting “surprisingly few cases” 
adjudicating superiority of a government action to a class action and describ-
ing only a handful of such cases involving public compensation); Steven B. 
Malech & Robert E. Koosa, Government Action and the Superiority Require-
ment: A Potential Bar to Private Class Action Lawsuits, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 1419 (2005) (explaining that only “approximately forty” class certification 
denials occurred from the early 1970s through the mid-2000s as a result of a 
court finding any form of government action the superior method of adjudica-
tion). Not all courts take the position that public compensation is relevant to 
the superiority determination. See Amalgamated Workers Union v. Hess Oil 
Virgin Islands Corp., 478 F.2d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that Rule 23 
“was not intended to weigh the superiority of a class action against possible 
administrative relief” by state labor commissioners). 
  
2370 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2313 
 
public compensation and private rights, but class certification 
denial is improper when the government action is not complet-
ed and when the rationale for denying certification is based on 
enhancing the bargaining leverage of the government enforcer. 
1. Class Certification Review Appropriately Harmonizes  
Private Rights and Completed Public Compensation 
Denying class certification after public compensation is 
complete, or after the terms of public compensation are deter-
mined, impairs private rights only when one of two conditions 
exist: (1) individuals in the putative class were excluded from 
receiving public compensation, or (2) recipients of public com-
pensation received less than full compensation and a class ac-
tion could effectively remedy this failure. Courts have appro-
priately denied class certification following completed public 
compensation when neither of these conditions existed because 
there was no obtainable relief remaining for the class members. 
For instance, a state court denied class certification where a 
state securities regulator settled litigation by requiring the new 
owner of a group of cemeteries to assume all contractual obliga-
tions breached by the prior owner, including “honor all pre-
need contracts, and advance over $14,800,000 to trusts” to en-
sure performance of contracts.247 Conversely, courts have certi-
fied a class where the public compensation was not comprehen-
sive and complete, allowing the class to obtain additional relief 
for their injuries.248 These outcomes effectively harmonize pub-
lic compensation and private rights. 
A few courts have denied class certification following com-
pleted public compensation that did not provide exhaustive re-
 
 247. Farno v. Ansure Mortuaries, LLC, 953 N.E.2d 1253, 1268 (Ind. App. 
2011); see also Wechsler v. Se. Properties, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 13, 16–17 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972), aff’d, 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing the state Attorney General 
settlement provided relief to investors in putative class that would “make 
them whole”); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 40, 
46 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (stating that public compensation obtained by state At-
torney General and insurance commissioner “covers all members of the pro-
posed class . . . and provides full co-pay relief on all but de minimis claims”). 
 248. See, e.g., In re Conseco Life Ins. Co. LifeTrend Ins. Sales & Mktg. 
Litig., 270 F.R.D. 521, 533 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (certifying a class after a state 
regulator settlement with public compensation because the insureds “may be 
entitled to other relief through this class action”); Gouldd v. Lowrance, No. 07-
97-0401-CV, 1998 WL 526489 at *7 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (certifying class alleg-
ing illegal pyramid scheme following enforcement action because the Texas 
Attorney General settlement “merely requires Equinox to renotify a certain 
portion of its Texas distributors . . . about its refund policy”). 
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lief. These cases constitute a situation, albeit uncommon, where 
public compensation meaningfully impinges on private rights. 
The question is what sort of procedure best protects private 
rights against the alleged conflicts of interest between the gov-
ernment enforcer and the putative class. Compare an imagined 
scheme of class action procedures in public compensation cases, 
as advocated by scholars critical of public compensation, with 
the current procedure of deciding this matter on a class certifi-
cation motion.  
Judicial review of each public compensation settlement 
akin to class action procedure would mean a hearing at which 
the opposing parties in the enforcement action maintain a 
shared interest in obtaining judicial review of a negotiated res-
titution plan. The adequacy of the public compensation pro-
gram would be evaluated as part of an uncontested motion for 
which both parties have strong incentives to contend that the 
settlement is adequate. It is unclear how such a costly review 
would help consumers with a viable class claim obtain appro-
priate relief if the settlement could have better protected their 
interests. Use of this procedure likely would increase the 
chance of certification denial in a subsequent class action be-
cause the existence of notice and review procedures would be 
an argument in favor of finding public compensation superior 
to private aggregate litigation.  
In contrast, in a class certification motion, counsel for the 
putative class surely will point out any private interests that 
were not adequately represented in the design of the public 
compensation. If the government enforcer has conflicts of inter-
est or its restitution program reflects bias by public officials, it 
is difficult to imagine a better and more motivated advocate 
than putative class counsel for discovering and articulating 
those concerns in the certification stage of the proceeding. For 
example, in one of the cases denying class certification due to 
the existence of public compensation, the court considered 
whether reputational concerns of state officials “may place pub-
lic attorneys in a situation analogous to private counsel who 
hope to win large fee awards,” which is one of the conflicts of 
interest of concern to scholarly critics.249 A class certification 
motion would seem to be an ideal forum for effectuating the 
 
 249. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 40, 45 (E.D. Mich. 
1996) (quoting Oswald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.2d 1106, 1125 (7th Cir. 
1979)). 
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“hard look” judicial review sought by the critics of public com-
pensation to remedy concerns of representational adequacy.  
In two particular circumstances, however, judicial reason-
ing for denial of class certification should be reconsidered. 
First, when the public enforcement action is pending rather 
than completed, class certification should not be denied on this 
basis, except when the public action involves state antitrust en-
forcement under the Clayton Act. Second, courts should not 
consider whether certifying a class action would interfere with 
the bargaining position of a government enforcer.  
2. Pending Public Enforcement and Class Certification 
Some courts have cited a pending rather than completed 
public enforcement action as a basis for denying class certifica-
tion.250 Several of these cases involve state antitrust enforce-
ment under the Clayton Act. Courts in these antitrust cases 
have appropriately deferred to the state enforcement action be-
cause the statutory scheme under the Clayton Act puts state 
enforcer damage claims in direct conflict with the class, and 
Congress clearly intended for the government action to take 
precedence.251  
In cases other than state antitrust actions, courts should 
not deny class certification solely due to a pending parallel gov-
ernment action. The same reasons that lead courts to reject ef-
forts to hamper government enforcement by equating public 
compensation with class action relief should apply in reverse 
when considering whether to certify a class in the face of a 
pending government action. Government enforcers have discre-
tion to not seek or to bargain away the size of public compensa-
tion in service of other enforcement objectives, so there should 
be no presumption that the outcome of the public action will 
constitute adequate relief for a putative class.252 One option 
available to courts in this situation is to stay the determination 
 
 250. Malech & Huttner, supra note 246, at 7–10. 
 251. Farmer, supra note 92, at 387–89 (collecting and describing cases). 
 252. Courts also have cited the potential for public compensation from a 
public action not yet filed at the time of the class certification motion, alt-
hough this reasoning has not been used as a primary justification for denying 
class certification. Malech & Huttner, supra note 246, at 9–10 (collecting cases 
and concluding that “no case has yet held that an anticipated or potential suit 
should be a dispositive factor in precluding certification”). Courts should not 
take this approach because the rationale for not deferring to pending govern-
ment actions applies with even more force to anticipated but not extant gov-
ernment enforcement. 
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of class certification until the completion of the public case, 
thus allowing comparison of the actual public compensation 
with the claims of the putative class.253 Or similarly, courts can 
certify the class and hear a decertification motion if the public 
enforcement action resolves with public compensation.254 
3. Denying Class Certification in Deference to Public  
Enforcement 
Courts also deny certification when allowing the class to 
proceed would impair the bargaining position of government 
enforcers seeking to settle an enforcement action. In Thornton 
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,255 plaintiffs sought 
certification of a class of Ohio residents who did not file a claim 
with State Farm under a multistate attorneys general settle-
ment. In finding that the class was not a superior method of ad-
judication, the federal district court observed: 
[I]f courts consistently allow parallel or subsequent class actions in 
spite of state action, the state’s ability to obtain the best settlement 
for its residents may be impacted, since the accused may not wish to 
settle with the state only to have the state settlement operate as a 
floor on liability or otherwise be used against it.256 
Enforcement defendants may well be more likely to settle 
with government enforcers for public compensation if that relief 
prevents certification of a coattail class action, but that is not a 
valid reason to deny certification. If government enforcers do 
not represent private interests, they should not gain bargaining 
leverage at the expense of a putative class action by bargaining 
away the interests of the class. This same rationale applies to 
 
 253. Belfiore v. Procter & Gamble Co., 311 F.R.D. 29, 39 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 
2015). The federal district court also took this approach in Wechsler v. South-
eastern Properties, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 13, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 254. Bryan v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313, 318–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“The 
possibility that the FTC may at some future time secure refunds for the class 
is not an adequate reason to deny a class determination in this case, which 
seeks present and independent relief. If the FTC proceeding should ever as-
sure the rights of the parties, defendants may apply for a stay of this action or 
for other appropriate relief.”). 
 255. No. 1:06-cv-00018, 2006 WL 3359482 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2006); see 
also Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 212 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing 
whether a class would “possibly to some extent negate the work on the state 
level” is a factor in determining superiority); In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., 2012 
WL 1569827, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012) (discussing cases in which “it is 
not simply the existence of the parallel government action but the threat that 
certification of the Rule 23(b)(3) class poses to the success or enforcement of 
the government action that led courts to deny certification”). 
 256. Thornton, 2006 WL 3359482, at *3. 
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the other situation in which public compensation conflicts with 
private rights, which is opt-in public compensation. 
B. OPT-IN PUBLIC COMPENSATION THROUGH REQUIRED  
RELEASE SETTLEMENTS 
Government enforcers sometimes settle cases by making 
public compensation contingent on the recipient releasing 
claims against the enforcement defendant.257 A release re-
quirement converts public compensation into an opt-in class, as 
exists in some mass employment claims,258 with the government 
enforcer in the position of class counsel. This circumstance calls 
into question the separation of public and private enforcement 
because the government enforcer requires the potential recipi-
ent of relief to make a choice between public relief and a pri-
vate right to sue. Forcing this choice breaches the line between 
public enforcement and private rights and thus makes appro-
priate an inquiry into the adequacy of the government as rep-
resentative of the recipients of public compensation.259 This 
subpart argues that such settlements should be discouraged 
and suggests reforms to public compensation to achieve this re-
sult. 
1. Required Releases and Private Rights 
Unlike the unfounded apprehension over public compensa-
tion precluding later assertion of private rights, required re-
lease settlements necessitate an affirmative decision by the re-
cipient to accept an offered bargain at the price of the release. 
The predicate question, therefore, is whether a voluntary relin-
 
 257. This subpart concerns only cases in which a determined amount of 
money or other relief is conditioned on a release. Some enforcement cases set-
tle by an agreement to allow claimants an opportunity to present their indi-
vidual cases for consideration by a neutral or the government enforcer, which 
does not present the same concerns as conditioning a share of group relief. 
 258. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012) (providing opt-in procedure in certain wage un-
derpayment cases). 
 259. In some cases, the national mortgage settlement between state attor-
neys general and the five largest mortgage servicing banks being a significant 
example, the government enforcer will expressly state that private claims are 
not within the scope of the release as a precaution against later arguments 
that public compensation has preclusive effect. Wells Fargo, which was one of 
the settling banks in the national mortgage settlement, nonetheless argued 
that the South Carolina Attorney General’s participation in the settlement 
had preclusive effect on a later assertion of a private claim by a South Caroli-
na homeowner. The district court dismissed the argument as “disingenuous.” 
Harlin v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. 3:13-cv-02719 (D.S.C. June 16, 2014). 
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quishment of rights by recipients of public compensation raises 
any concern about the relationship between public compensa-
tion and private rights. Indeed, Lemos argues that required re-
lease settlements are one means of affording the procedural 
protections she deems required by Due Process.260 
A voluntary and affirmative exchange of a release for com-
pensation does not obviate questions about the representation-
al adequacy of government enforcers for three reasons. First, 
the release option arrives with the government enforcer’s im-
plicit encouragement to accept. The credibility of public sanc-
tion of the offer gives urgency to ensuring that the relief is ade-
quate compared to the consequence of a release of claims. In 
fact, some evidence exists that participation rates in public set-
tlements can be substantially higher than in class action cases 
requiring filed claims.261  
Second, there is an asymmetry between the total loss of 
rights resulting from a required release settlement and the op-
portunity for public cure of inadequate relief resulting from a 
class action settlement. A release accompanying public com-
pensation extinguishes the claim of the person executing the 
release, and also may make it more difficult to certify a class 
only of people not executing the release.262 Government enforc-
ers, however, have options for curing inadequate class settle-
ments. Courts generally find no preclusive effect for public 
compensation sought subsequent to a final judgment in a pri-
vate action,263 so in most cases government enforcers can simply 
 
 260. Lemos, supra note 7, at 547. 
 261. Class actions often have participation of less than five percent, even in 
opt-out cases where the potential recipient’s claims will be released regardless 
of participation in the class settlement. Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence, 
Claims Procedures in Large Consumer Class Actions and Equitable Distribu-
tion of Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 751–54 (1988). In contrast, pub-
lic compensation settlements often have much higher participation rates. See, 
e.g., Thornton, 2006 WL 3359482, at *1 (approximately thirty-nine percent ac-
ceptance rate). 
 262. See, e.g., Thornton, 2006 WL 3359482 (refusing to certify a class even 
though more than half of the class did not opt-in to public compensation). 
 263. EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1293 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(reversing district court holding that EEOC precluded in seeking monetary 
relief in racial discrimination pattern and practice case involving over 200 
employees by prior private suit joining thirty-six private plaintiffs and stating 
“it is so unusual to find privity between a governmental agency and private 
plaintiffs because governmental agencies have statutory duties, responsibili-
ties, and interests that are far broader than the discrete interests of a private 
party”); Herman v. S.C. Nat’l Bank, 140 F.3d 1413 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that Secretary of Labor could pursue ERISA action seeking equitable relief 
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proceed in the face of a prior class result. Even when a prior 
private judgment is considered preclusive, government enforc-
ers have the threat of civil penalties and other remedies as lev-
erage to obtain public compensation in settlements. A recent 
$60-million settlement in a case brought by DOJ and FDIC 
against Sallie Mae and affiliated entities for alleged violations 
of laws protecting active duty military personnel with student 
loan debt, for example, provided that public compensation was 
owed to service members even if the enforcement defendants 
had earlier obtained a release of claims by the service mem-
ber.264 Because public enforcement can cure inadequate relief in 
private enforcement, but private enforcement cannot resolve 
inadequate public compensation in required release settle-
ments, the adequacy of government enforcer representation in 
such settlements is a relevant concern.  
Third, government enforcers sometimes are not well posi-
tioned to protect the rights of individual recipients who may 
have losses substantial enough to make an individual claim or 
defense feasible, yet who waive the right to that claim by ac-
cepting public compensation. The extent of harm may not have 
been apparent to the recipient at the time he signs the release, 
either because the amount of the loss is not apparent or the loss 
has not occurred.  
A 2005 $40-million settlement between forty-nine state at-
torneys general and State Farm offers an example of this prob-
lem.265 Almost all states require that an automobile title carry a 
 
including restitution despite court-approved class action settlement); Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Commercial Hedge Servs., Inc., 422 F. 
Supp. 2d 1057, 1061 (D. Neb. 2006) (rejecting preclusion of CFTC claim for 
restitution where investors had executed releases in private settlements be-
cause public compensation serves “distinct deterrence functions”). Compare 
FTC v. AMREP Corp., 705 F. Supp. 119, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that a 
prior class action precludes FTC from seeking restitution but not other relief), 
with FTC v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2006) amended on re-
consideration in part, 472 F. Supp. 2d 990 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, 512 F.3d 858 
(7th Cir. 2008) (allowing FTC to seek restitution despite adverse trial result in 
prior class action and holding that FTC and class members are not in privity). 
But see People ex rel. Spitzer v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 894 N.E.2d 1, 11–15 
(N.Y. 2008) (holding the New York Attorney General was precluded from seek-
ing restitution but not disgorgement following class action settlement). 
 264. Consent Order, United States v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00600-
LPS, ¶ 29 (D. Del. May 13, 2014). 
 265. Press Release, Iowa Attorney Gen., States Reach Agreement with 
State Farm Insurance that Will Result in $40 Million to Consumers (Jan. 10, 
2005), http://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/newsroom/states-reach-agreement 
-with-state-farm-insurance-that-will-result-in-40-million-to-consumers. 
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“salvage” brand after it has been in an accident that results in 
loss of a high percentage of the value of the vehicle. The case 
involved State Farm’s failure to obtain branded titles when 
purchasing and then reselling salvage vehicles following acci-
dents involving their insureds. The settlement paid about $800 
to $1850 per purchaser of an improperly titled car, but the car 
owners were required to sign an unqualified release of claims 
against the insurer.266 Public attorneys experienced in pursuing 
public law enforcement claims may have little or no experience 
representing auto buyers in salvage title cases, and thus might 
not be cognizant of all the implications of the release. It is rea-
sonable to assume that driving a salvaged vehicle with unde-
tected structural defects increases the chance of serious injury. 
So a consumer may have taken $1500 in compensation from the 
state attorneys general settlement in 2005 only to be seriously 
injured or killed in an accident in 2006 caused by structural de-
fects in the vehicle for which a claim against State Farm may 
have been feasible but possibly released. 
2. Required Releases Rarely Needed in Public Compensation 
There often is no compelling need for government enforcers 
to enter into required release settlements to ensure that con-
sumers, investors or employees receive relief. Public compensa-
tion that offers full relief should prevent certification of a later 
class action. In cases where a class action is not feasible for 
other reasons, there should be no value for the defendant in the 
release other than absolving it of individual claims of substan-
tial amounts, which is a problem with releases the government 
enforcer should seek to avoid. And when a class action is feasi-
ble but the public action cannot be settled for full relief, the 
government enforcer’s discretion among various remedial op-
tions makes it unnecessary to bargain away private rights in 
the form of a release. It can more aggressively pursue injunc-
tive restrictions and civil penalties, thus leaving compensation 
to a private action.  
The obvious reason for the government enforcer to enter 
this type of settlement is the bargaining leverage provided be-
cause the release has value for the enforcement defendant. 
Government enforcers can use that leverage in two ways: to ob-
tain better injunctive terms or civil penalties, or to improve the 
amount or terms of public compensation. The former presents a 
 
 266. Id.; see also Assurance of Discontinuance, In re State Farm Automo-
bile Insurance Company, No. 0532CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005). 
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direct conflict between public compensation and private rights, 
and trading purely public relief for a release of private rights is 
hard to justify. 
The latter circumstance—when the government enforcer 
agrees to a required release as a means of improving the 
amount or terms of relief to the group receiving the compensa-
tion—raises difficult questions. This situation has consequence 
when class feasibility is uncertain, or the government enforcer 
determines a class action will not obtain relief as substantial as 
would occur through public compensation. The difficulty is that 
these decisions result in the release of private claims, so the 
government enforcer cannot rely on a coattail class action if the 
public compensation is deemed insufficient or if an individual 
has an unusual, high-value claim. The next subpart looks at 
law reform options for targeted changes to ameliorate concerns 
with required release settlements while preserving their use 
when consistent with private rights. 
3. Limiting Required Release Settlements 
This subpart proposes a broad reform and a narrow reform 
for required release settlements. The broad reform is to impose 
judicial review and public notice with all required release set-
tlements. This reform is aimed at ensuring public compensa-
tion is adequate for the relinquishment of rights. The narrow 
reform is for government enforcers and courts to carefully re-
view and restrict the scope of releases, which is aimed at pre-
venting individual recipients with high-value claims from suf-
fering unknown or unintended consequences. 
Judicial Review and Notice. Some enforcement actions face 
review by a court; others do not.267 All required release settle-
ments should be subject to meaningful judicial review because 
they present the potential for loss of private rights. Judicial re-
view should be preceded by some form of public notice of the 
proposed terms of the settlement and an opportunity to object. 
The notice need not be onerous because the likely audience for 
the notice is made up of attorneys with an interest in the mat-
ter as a possible class action. A posting of proposed settlement 
terms at a known website would be sufficient. 
These procedural reforms would induce appropriate re-
straint by government enforcers. Nothing requires a govern-
ment enforcer to enter required release settlements. Faced with 
 
 267. See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text. 
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the prospect of public notice followed by judicial review, gov-
ernment enforcers would have a disincentive to use this form of 
settlement unless it were essential to the creation of a deal, and 
then only if the deal would withstand scrutiny. The degree of 
scrutiny likely would be related to the value of the lost private 
claims. 
Limiting Release Scope. Courts should give especially care-
ful consideration to the scope of releases when reviewing these 
settlements. At minimum, required release settlements should 
contain limits on the amount or circumstances of the release to 
address the problem of individuals with unusual, substantial 
claims. Circumstance restrictions could have been effective in 
the State Farm case, with a release limited to claims related to 
diminished vehicle value as a result of violating title branding 
law. The exclusion of claims for personal injury or wrongful 
death would have ameliorated the potential for the settlement 
to result in the release of claims with extraordinary value for 
isolated individuals. 
The 2002 settlement between fifty state attorneys general 
and Household International provides an example, good and 
bad, of an attempt to restrict a release. The settlement included 
$484 million in public compensation in the form of cash pay-
ments to homeowners who the attorneys general alleged were 
deceived by Household in the origination of subprime mortgag-
es.268 The payments averaged about $1500 per homeowner, but 
to obtain that payment the homeowner had to sign a release of 
all claims against Household, with one exception—homeowners 
could raise otherwise released claims as a defense in foreclo-
sure.269 The importance of this release exception became appar-
ent when foreclosure rates soared in the years after the settle-
ment. But the settlement did result in the release of powerful 
claims other than in foreclosure that were possessed by many 
Household borrowers. One particularly important claim was an 
action to rescind the loan under the Home Ownership and Eq-
uity Protection Act, which would allow for the return of up to 
three years of loan payments to the borrower.270  
 
 268. Consent Judgment, Washington v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02-2-
35630-3, ¶ 4 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2002). 
 269. Id. ¶ 32. 
 270. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012). 
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  CONCLUSION   
Public compensation is poorly understood by scholars, de-
spite the size of recoveries and its increasing prominence. This 
Article describes the statutory schemes authorizing public 
compensation in different regulatory fields and demonstrates 
why the existing law of preclusion appropriately resolves ques-
tions about the constitutionality of public compensation as it is 
currently practiced. This Article also situates public compensa-
tion within the context of its use as a discretionary remedy in 
public enforcement so as to dispel the power of the superficially 
appealing analogy between public compensation and class ac-
tions, and instead focuses discussion of the friction between 
public compensation and private rights on two narrow catego-
ries of cases where the conflict actually occurs. 
Government enforcers and courts can do a better job of 
aligning public enforcement with private rights when public 
compensation is conditioned on a release of claims and in some 
cases where courts consider public compensation as a factor in 
class certification. Courts and policy-makers, however, should 
give scant notice to scholarship proposing sweeping procedural 
reform. The new scholarly critics offer a wholly abstract cri-
tique of public compensation that has little connection to how 
government enforcers exercise discretion in civil law enforce-
ment. Stripped of its proper context, public compensation ap-
pears as a cartoon version of a class action lawsuit that may 
deprive recipients of their rights.  
This Article is replete with examples of public compensa-
tion providing relief for large numbers of consumers, investors, 
and employees—often full compensation. To name a few: pay-
ments to over-charged payday loan borrowers; refunds to pur-
chasers of medications who paid an inflated price due to anti-
trust violations; students credited for improper bank fees; 
payments to female employees denied promotional opportuni-
ties; protecting the contract interests of people who prepaid for 
cemetery services; account credits to subprime credit card hold-
ers charged for “add-on” services; and even the long-past exam-
ple of tenants receiving money back from a landlord charging 
rent in excess of World War II price limits. Placing new and 
unhelpful procedural obstacles in the way of this type of relief 
would be a disservice to the people who benefit from public en-
forcement of laws designed to protect them. 
 
